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Abstract
Rapid growth and structural change have reduced poverty in East Asian economies. Income 
inequality has been low in Korea and Taiwan, but has risen in recent years with economic 
liberalization. In the Southeast Asian economies of Th   ailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, poverty 
has declined, while income inequality trends have varied, rising most clearly in Th  ailand.  With  its 
strengthened (private) property rights, market liberalization and sustained rapid growth, China has 
also experienced increased inequality despite considerable poverty reduction. Hence, the common 
claim of egalitarian growth in East Asia may have been exaggerated, especially since the 1990s.
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Jomo K.S.
Th   e ‘growth with equity’ said to characterize East Asia owes to a variety of political, social, and economic fac-
tors. In addition to government interventions crucial to growth and structural change, there has been consid-
erable economic liberalization over the last two decades. Th   e rapid economic development characterizing the 
region has undoubtedly raised living standards, but the impacts of this growth on inequality have been much 
less clear. In this paper we investigate these relationships through a comparison of East Asian countries’ social 
records in recent decades. We consider not only the eﬀ  ects of growth and liberalization on inequality, but 
also the inherent consequences and redistributive mechanisms associated with recent policies. 
Th   is paper explores the consequences of trade and ﬁ  nancial liberalization—including liberalization 
of the rules governing foreign direct investment (FDI)—on inequality and poverty in several East Asian 
economies that have grown rapidly for several decades. Th   e exercise begins with a review of the historical 
policies and events that have shaped these economies. In Northeast Asia, the study focuses on the Republic 
of Korea (South Korea) and the Taiwan Province of China (henceforth, Taiwan), while selected Southeast 
Asian countries include the second-generation newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of Malaysia, Th  ailand 
and Indonesia. Th   e paper reviews the distributional impacts of liberalization in Th   ailand, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, and China. Th   e unusual urban economies of the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR) of 
China and the island Republic of Singapore, which have seen greater and rising inequality, and the Philip-
pines, which has experienced modest and volatile growth during recent decades, are also brought into this 
review.
All of the economies in consideration experienced unprecedented growth and structural transforma-
tion over the last few decades (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). Average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
1  Assistance from Foo Ah Hiang, Mohd Aslam, Lee Hwok Aun, Anis Chowdhury, Ragayah Mat Zin and especially 
Lauren E. Anderson is gratefully acknowledged. Th   e usual caveats apply. 
Table 1. 
Six high performing Asian economies: Economic indicators, 1970-2002
Economy 
Per capita
income (US$) Annual GDP growth (%) Manufacturing/GDP share (%)
1995 2002 1970 1985 1995 1970 1980 1990 1995 1999 2002
South Korea  9700 9930 8.3 6.8 9.2 21.0 29 28.8 27 31.8 29.2
Taiwan 8788a na 10.1 7.71 35.0d na na 42.0a na na
Malaysia 3890 3540 6.0 -1.1 9.8 12 21 24.2 33 31.6 30.7
Indonesia 980 710 8.2c 3.5c 8.4c 10 13 20.7 24 25.8 25
Thailand 2740 1980 11.4 4.6 9.2 16 22 27.2 29 32.4 33.8
Chinae 940 19.4b 13.5b 10.5b na 42.2 37 na 43.1 44.9
Sources:  GDP Growth Data from United Nations Statistics Division (UNSTAT) except for Taiwan; Other data from World Bank 
(1997: Tables 12, 13, 15); 2002 ﬁ  gures from ADB (2003); Taiwan ﬁ  gures from Yu (1994) and Lee (1994).
Notes:  a: for 1991; b: Data for China do not include data for Hong Kong; Macao; or Taiwan; c: Data for Indonesia include 
Timor-Leste for 1976-1999; d: for industry; e: China’s 1970 GDP growth rate of 19.4 % appears implausible; especially since 
China was deeply mired in the chaos of the ‘Great Cultural Revolution’ and many factories were closing. Even though this is the 
same GDP growth rate reported by the State Statistic Bureau of China, most economists do not compare China’s current statistics 
with data collected prior to 1978.2  DESA Working Paper No. 33
rates exceeded seven per cent and six per cent in the periods of 1970-1980 and 1980-1996, respectively. 
Th   e manufacturing sectors grew most rapidly, greatly contributing to growth, until some economies such as 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan began de-industrializing. Exports grew at double-digit levels annually 
between 1980 and 1992, resulting in a signiﬁ  cant increase in average per capita incomes. As a proportion 
of total growth, primary exports fell sharply, while machinery and transport equipment production grew, 
especially in the manufacturing sectors. In addition to the eight high performing Asian economies (HPAEs) 
of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Th   ailand and Indonesia (see World Bank, 1993), 
China has also grown very rapidly over the last twenty-ﬁ  ve years.
Th   e remarkable economic growth in East Asia over the last four to ﬁ  ve decades has generally im-
proved living standards. According to the World Bank, falling poverty levels and better income distribution 
have accompanied the expansion of manufacturing and exports in these economies. Extensive interventions 
in the market were important for late industrialization yet, most governments substantially liberalized their 
economies in the mid 1980s due to pressure from the West. Th   e World Trade Organization (WTO) and in-
ternational ﬁ  nancial institutions (IFIs), in addition to a renewed interest in deregulation following unpopu-
lar and counter-productive government interventions, also encouraged this wave of liberalization. 
Table 2. 
Six high performing Asian economies: Economic indicators, 1980-2002
 
Economy
Agriculture/GDP share (%) Services/GDP share (%)
1980 1990 1995 1999 2002 1980 1990 1995 1999 2002
South Korea  15 8.5 7 5 4 45 48.4 50 51.5 55.1
Taiwana na 4.18
Taiwana na 4.18 3.48 2.55 1.85 na na na na 69
Malaysia 22 15.2 13 10.8 9.1 40 44.2 44 43.1 46.4
Indonesia 24 19.4 17 19.4 17.5 34 41.5 41 37.7 38.1
Thailand 23 12.5 11 10.4 9 48 50.3 49 49.6 48.5
China 30.1 27 na 17.3 14.5 21.4 31.3 na 32.9 33.7
Sources:  World Bank (1997: Tables 12, 13, 15); Taiwan ﬁ  gures from Yu (1994) and Lee (1994); 2002 ﬁ  gures from ADB (2003). 
Data for Taiwan agriculture share from Th   e International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development; Data for Taiwan 
services share from CIA World Fact Book, 2005 estimates.
Note:  a: Taiwan agriculture share of GDP measured in current new Taiwan dollars (NT$).
Table 3. 
East Asia: Size and Growth of National Economies, 1980-2000














Japan 35,620 27,080 100.0       
Singapore 24,740 24,910 92.0 1 6.7 8 7.4
Korea 8,910 17,300 63.9 2 8.9 5.7 7.3
Malaysia 3,380 8,330 30.8 3 5.3 7 6.2
Thailand 2,000 6,320 23.3 4 7.6 4.2 5.9
Philippines 1,040 4,220 15.6 5 1 3.3 2.2
China 840 3,920 14.5 6 10.1 10.3 10.2
Indonesia 570 2,830 10.5 7 6.1 4.2 5.2
Vietnam 390 2,000 7.4 8 4.6 8.1 6.4
Source: World Bank (2002a; 2002b) as cited in Medhi and Ragayah (2006: Table 1).
Note: p/c = per capita; GNP = gross national product; PPP = purchasing power parity.Growth with Equity in East Asia  3
East Asian economies also developed by subsidizing an array of social development programmes. 
Asian policymakers have pursued for instance; (1) regime initiatives to secure greater political support and 
legitimacy (such as land reform and rural development initiatives), (2) human resource development (HRD) 
programmes (especially meritocratic publicly-funded education to the tertiary level), (3) signiﬁ  cant house-
hold savings (‘forced’ or otherwise) and (4) a greater role for government. Th   is paper investigates all of these 
factors--human resource development (especially education and training); redistribution and poverty target-
ing; more eﬀ  ective social safety nets; social corporatist and communitarian initiatives; quality-of-life im-
provement eﬀ  orts; technology promotion; and the more gradual liberalization of agricultural trade--in light 
of their impact on the distribution of wealth and poverty.
Th   ough East Asian growth and structural changes led to spectacular reductions in poverty, the 
impact on inequality has been much less apparent. Income inequality has been low in Korea and Taiwan, but 
has increased with globalization. Trends in Southeast Asia, including Th   ailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, have 
been harder to discern as poverty declined and inequality rose in conjunction with economic liberalization. 
With rapid growth and strengthened (private) property rights, China has also experienced a swift increase in 
inequality and unemployment despite considerable poverty reduction. Th   is evidence suggests that the World 
Bank’s (1993) claim of egalitarian growth in East Asia may be exaggerated, if not erroneous. Th  e  ‘initial 
conditions’ that appeared to be primarily responsible for more balanced growth in the Northeast (as com-
pared to Southeast Asia) were not suﬃ   cient to prevent a spike in Chinese inequality. Th   ere are, of course, 
exceptions. Northeast Asian countries for instance, experienced low unemployment and skill enhancement 
that generally strengthened the bargaining power and remuneration of labour. In East Asia, Korea is unique 
because it institutionalised some redistributive and welfare measures during its recent democratisation.
For most of the economies under consideration, the 1997-1998 regional ﬁ  nancial crises had great, 
but varied impacts on equity. Th   e substantial rhetoric on social safety nets during the crisis obscured the 
negative impacts of structural adjustment and economic liberalization programs in the 1990s on redistribu-
tion, welfare rights, and social protection provisions and institutions. Yet, there has been some retreat from 
Washington Consensus market fundamentalism (pro-liberalization policies) in recent years, as reﬂ  ected in 
the World Bank’s image under James Wolfensohn (1995-2005), the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
more recent espoused commitment to poverty reduction, and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) ap-
parent commitment to a ‘Doha Development Round’. Nevertheless, considerable and growing scepticism 
remains regarding the depth and extent of these changes sometimes referred to as the ‘post-Washington 
Consensus’ consensus’.
Unfortunately, available evidence does not allow robust and comparable commentary on recent 
trends in the distribution of assets, employment, social services (especially health and education), access to 
information and political participation in East Asia. Th   e following discussion therefore focuses on poverty 
and income distribution trends, but even here, most available data were collected in the early part of this 
decade. It remains very diﬃ   cult to assess the impact of East Asian government declarations promising greater 
equity, including those made at the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen. 
A Brief Review of Poverty Alleviation and Redistribution in East Asia
Th   e incidence of poverty declined sharply in the East Asian economies shown in Table 4. Income inequal-
ity declined or remained constant in Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia between 1976 and 1985. Th  e 
exception to this trend was Th   ailand, which did not make a signiﬁ  cant commitment to egalitarian redistribu-4  DESA Working Paper No. 33
tion. All these economies had explicit poverty alleviation and redistribution policies, though the impacts of 
these programs varied between countries. Th   ese countries also directed development relatively independently 
and maintained a strong commitment to achieving growth and redistribution.
Redistribution and Land Reform
Th   e South Korean and Taiwanese land reforms in the late 1940s were the ﬁ  rst important initiatives to reduce 
poverty and inequity in the Northeast Asian economies under consideration (see Hamilton, 1983; Hsiao, 
1996). In 1947, during the Korean War, the United States military forces distributed land conﬁ  scated from 
the Japanese colonial government to tillers in exchange for low rents. At the conclusion of the war, the Ko-
rean government acquired land from landlords and resold it at subsidized prices to 90,000 tenants (Amsden, 
1989). In Taiwan, the Kuomintang government exchanged shares in public companies for landlord’s lands, 
and also sold it at favourable prices to tillers. Th   ese reforms reduced land rents to 37.5 per cent of the yield 
for major crops, resulted in the sale of public land to cultivators and tenants, and eﬀ  ectively limited owner-
ship by landowners in Taiwan (Yu, 1994: footnote 1).
Meanwhile, competition among food producers and United States food aid under Public Law 480 
ensured low food prices in East Asian countries and beyond. Th   e terms of trade between agriculture and 
manufacturing favoured the latter, as small-scale farmers enjoyed little market power or political inﬂ  uence 
(Hamilton, 1983; Yu, 1994: footnote 2). Th   e Gini coeﬃ   cient measure of income inequality in Taiwan 
declined from 0.358 in 1966 to 0.318 in 1972 as farmers moved out of agriculture and into manufacturing 
and services. Th   e change for Korea however, was negligible, as the Gini moved from 0.334 in 1965 to 0.332 
in 1970 (Rao, 1993; Medhi, 1995: Table 1). 
When food aid ceased following the 1973 oil shock, the Korean government launched the Saemaul 
Undong program that, inter alia, increased domestic food supply. With the help of price controls, the state 
succeeded in providing industrial workers with cheap food, thus lowering the wage bill for manufacturing 
ﬁ  rms. Price controls helped keep consumer prices low so that both savings and investment rates rose in these 
economies. Taiwan also emphasized rural industrialization, encouraging manufacturing alongside farming. In 
the 1970s, both Korea and Taiwan introduced hybrid grain varieties and modernized farming, which helped 
expand the food supply and free more farm workers for industry. Since the 1980s, with increased liberaliza-
tion, income inequality has risen in both of these economies. In Korea, the Gini coeﬃ   cient rose to 0.400 in 
1988 and then again from 0.312 in 1993 to 0.32 in 2000. In Taiwan, the Gini coeﬃ   cient went from 0.277 
in 1980 to 0.345 in 2002 (see Table 5).  
Table 4. 
Five high performing Asian economies: Poverty incidence, 1970-2002
Economy 1970 1976 1980 1985 1993 1998 2000 2002
South Korea  23.4 14.8 9.8 na na 4.5b 3.6 na
Malaysia 52.4 42.4 29 20.7a 13.4 7.5b 5.5 5.1
Indonesia 57.1 50.1 39.8 21.6a na 23.4 na 18.2
Thailand 39 30 23 29.5 na 12.9 13.1 na
Sources: Medhi (1995: 58-73); Malaysia (1996); Habibullah (1988); Yu (1994: 6); Chowdhury and Islam (1993); data for 1998 
and 2000 from ADB, Key Indicators (various years) and data for Malaysia from Malaysia (1999, 2003, 2006).
Notes: na – not available; a 1984; b 1989. While inter-country comparison of changes is possible, cross-comparisons of rates in 
particular years is not possible due to classiﬁ  cation diﬀ  erences.Growth with Equity in East Asia  5
In the Southeast Asian economies, political and environmental circumstances have not induced pro-
active land redistribution measures comparable to those in Northeast Asia.  Countries like Korea and Taiwan 
are not rich in natural resources. Th   is is a contrast to the Southeast, where more abundant natural wealth 
may have weakened the imperative to industrialize, especially to promote export-oriented manufacturing. 
Political considerations as well as ethnic diversity may have further limited more activist industrial policy 
initiatives in Southeast Asia. After seceding from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore’s leaders sought to quickly 
develop a large foreign stake in their economy to secure protection against potentially belligerent neighbours. 
With the introduction of pro-Malay aﬃ   rmative action policies beginning in the early 1970s, it is widely 
believed that foreign investment was encouraged to ‘balance’ the ubiquitous ethnic Chinese presence in the 
Malaysian economy.
As a consequence, the region, especially Singapore and Malaysia, has relied far more on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to industrialize and especially to develop export-oriented manufacturing capacity. 
Labour, in particular wage repression, has attracted FDI. Currency under-valuation also discouraged imports 
and boosted export competitiveness, attracting investments in new manufacturing activities. Diﬀ  erent colo-
nial interests and policies (such as those employed in the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Korea) may have 
also been more or less conducive to industrialization. Th   e success of agricultural exports as well as greater 
natural resource wealth further diminished the imperative to industrialize and develop higher value-added 
services. US-led Cold War eﬀ  orts to secure a political cordon sanitaire around the ‘communist bloc’ ensured 
considerable aid as well as economic policies conducive to equitable and rapid development. Compared to 
Korea and Taiwan, Southeast Asia has developed more modest planning and pro-active selective industrial 
promotion capacities and implemented fewer eﬀ  ective education, training and research programs conducive 
to rapid technological advancement. Th   is has deepened the divide in the development of their industrial and 
technological capabilities, and hence, their prospects for greater productivity growth and labour remunera-
tion (Jomo, 2001).
Although there has not been any major land reform in Malaysia, new agricultural areas have been 
distributed through land development schemes managed by government agencies such as the Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA) 
and the Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA). Although these programmes have 
had some eﬀ  ect on poverty alleviation, their impact has been limited (see Halim, 1991; Jomo, 1986). Ma-
laysia deepened its rural development eﬀ  orts following the 1971 introduction of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), a program committed to poverty reduction and greater inter-ethnic parity via redistribution. Besides 
Table 5. 
Six high performing Asian economies: Household income distribution Gini coefﬁ  cients, 1970-2002
Economy 1970 1976 1980 1985 1999 2000 2002
China na na na na 0.32g na na
Indonesia 0.35 0.34 0.34c 0.33 0.31 0.3 na
Malaysia 0.506 0.529 0.493a 0.474c 0.4432 na 0.4607
South Korea 0.332 0.391 0.389 0.357d 0.3204 0.32 na
Taiwan 0.294 0.28 0.277 0.29 0.325 na 0.345
Thailand na 0.451 0.473b 0.500f 0.444 0.43 0.428
Sources: Medhi (1995: 58-73); Malaysia (1996, 2003); Habibullah (1988); Taiwan Gini coeﬃ   cients are from Yu (1994: 6); 
Chowdhury and Islam (1993); 1999, 2002 data are from ADB website; Th   ailand data from the Th   ailand National Statistical 
Oﬃ   ce.
Notes: a 1979; b 1981; c 1984; d 1989; e 1998; na – not available.6  DESA Working Paper No. 33
extensive investments to develop infrastructure in rural areas where Bumiputera were heavily concentrated, 
special ministries and government agencies, such as Bank Bumiputera, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), and 
Pernas, were also set up to enhance the socio-economic standing of the Bumiputera.2  With rapid economic 
growth led by export-oriented manufacturing in the 1970s, poverty rapidly declined over the next two de-
cades. In addition, the Green Revolution in rice cultivation, which involved double cropping, green revolu-
tion strains, fertilizers, pesticides, ploughing and harvesting machinery, raised yields and incomes. Income 
inequality trends are unclear, but seem to suggest growing inequality in the 1960s, declining inequality in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and increasing inequality thereafter (Jomo and Ishak, 1986; Hashim, 1997). 
Like Malaysia, Th   ai authorities emphasized agricultural diversiﬁ  cation. In the 1960s, new lands were 
opened with little emphasis on land or income redistribution to help disadvantaged groups (Onchan, 1995: 
7-8). Th   ai land reforms were formally introduced with the 1975 Agricultural Land Reform Act, however 
most property was transferred to wealthy, politically inﬂ  uential businessmen instead of the less fortunate 
(Onchan, 1995). 
Th   ough land reforms have generally been unsuccessful despite these important initiatives, growth 
has helped lower the overall incidence of poverty (except in the mid-1980s). Th   e governments of Japan, 
Taiwan, and Korea have been fairly successful in boosting rural household incomes through the promotion 
of oﬀ  -farm rural work. As a consequence, the proportion of rural household incomes from oﬀ  -farm activities 
rose from 46 per cent in 1971-1972 to 63 per cent in 1986-1987 (Onchan, 1995: 32). Th   is helped further 
reduce rural poverty in the 1985-1990 period, when urban poverty was on the rise (see Rasiah, Ishak and 
Jomo, 1996: Tables 4a, 4b). Unfortunately despite such poverty reduction, income inequality has worsened 
(see Tables 5 and 6).
2  Bumiputera translated literally means “sons of the soil”, but is generally used to refer to ethnic Malays and other 
indigenous people of Malaysia.
Table 6. 
Gini Ratios for Household Income in Eight East Asian Economies, 1961-2005
Year 
Asian NIEs ASEAN-4
Korea Singaporea China Indonesiab Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
1961       0.49
(0.486)
  
1962        0.414  
1964         
1965 0.344      0.49
(0.491)
  
1966   0.498       
1967      0.498    
1968        0.429  
1970 0.332     0.506
(0.502)
   
1971       0.480
(0.478)
  
1972         
1973   (0.46)       
1974   (0.45)       
         
1975  0.448
(0.45)
     0.451
(0.426)
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Table 6 (cont’d)
Year
Asian NIEs (New) ASEAN-4
Korea Singaporea China Indonesiab Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
1976 0.391 (0.44)  0.34
(0.492)
(0.529)    
1977   (0.46)       
          
1978   (0.42)       
1979  0.424
(0.42)
   0.493
(0.493)
   
1980 0.389 (0.41)   0.34     
1981  0.443
(0.44)





   0.465    





   
1985   (0.46)     0.452
(0.446)
  
1986   (0.46)      (0.500)  
1987  (0.47)   0.32 (0.458)      
1988 (0.400) (0.48)     (0.445) (0.479)  
1989   (0.49) 0.349      
1990   0.436      (0.504)  
1991         
1992 0.284       0.536  
1993 0.281     0.459    0.33
1994 0.285      0.46 0.521  
1995 0.284 0.443 0.389  0.464    0.356
1996 0.291  0.375 0.366    0.516  
1997 0.283 0.444 0.379  0.47 0.51    
1998 0.316 0.446 0.386     0.509 0.348
1999 0.320 0.467 0.397 0.373 0.452  0.531  
2000 0.317 0.490 0.458    0.51 0.525  
2001 0.320 0.493  0.31       0.407
2002 0.312 0.505  0.33 0.461   0.505  
2003 0.341 0.512       
2004 0.344 0.517    0.462    
2005 0.348 0.522       
Sources as cited by Medhi and Ragayah (2006: Table 2): Figures not in parentheses are from Rao (1988).  Figures in parentheses 
are new series derived from the following sources: Hong Kong: T.B. Lin (1994) as cited by Medhi and Ragayah (2006); Korea, 
Leipziger et al. (1992); Singapore, Rao (1993); Taiwan: C.Y. Lin (1994) as cited by Medhi and Ragayah (2006); Indonesia: 
Tjondronegoro et al. (1992), World Bank (1990); Malaysia: Ishak and Ragayah (1990); Philippines: Balisacan (1992); Th  ailand: 
Medhi (1994). From 1992 onward, for most countries, a new series of data are used. Data sources are as follows: Korea: UFIES 
(2003), Korea National Statistical Oﬃ   ce (2006); Singapore: Department of Statistics (DOS) (2003; 2006); China: Tian He, Wang 
Xiaoming, and Liu Fande (2003); Indonesia: Alisjahbana et al. (2003); BPS (BPS is Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan 
Pusat Statistik) for 2001-2002; Malaysia: Ragayah (2003); Philippines: Balisacan and Piza (2003); Th   ailand: Somchai and Jiraporn 
(2001).
Notes: a Up to 1989, for employed population, not households. From 1990, it is based on ranking of all resident households by per 
capita monthly household income from work. b  Employed expenditure, not income, data.8  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Human Resources and Education
Th   ough the eﬀ  ects of land reform have been mixed, investments in human resources have helped reduce 
poverty and inequality. Th   rough government eﬀ  orts, Korea and Taiwan have developed highly educated 
labour forces. Universal primary education since the 1960s has been complemented by high enrolments in 
secondary and tertiary levels, and a strong emphasis on technical and engineering disciplines. Clearly these 
investments in human capital went well beyond the primary schooling limit recommended by the World 
Bank, with labour market interventions based on long-term considerations beyond current prices (Rodrik, 
1994). Th   e expansion of education not only helped generate technical and professional human resources for 
industrial upgrading, but also enhanced opportunities for upward socio-economic mobility, including skills 
enhancement and higher remuneration (Deyo, 1989).
Achievements in secondary and particularly in tertiary education in Malaysia, Th   ailand and Indone-
sia have not been comparable to those in Korea and Taiwan, as shown in Table 7 and Table 8. Interestingly, 
the Philippines performed better on many educational achievement indicators than Malaysia, Th  ailand  and 
Indonesia, raising serious doubts about the actual role and contribution of human resource development 
to growth and equality. While basic education has oﬀ  ered access to low-skilled jobs, such schooling has 
oﬀ  ered limited upward social mobility in the absence of signiﬁ  cant technological change and value addi-
tion. Furthermore, while Taiwan and Korea have generated ample supplies of technical labour, Malaysia, 
Th   ailand and Indonesia continue 
to face serious shortages. In 1990, 
these three South Asian countries had 
around 400 technologists and scien-
tists per million people, compared to 
2,200 for Korea; 2,100 for Taiwan; 
and 6,700 for Japan (UNDP, 1994: 
17). Th   ough Malaysia and Indonesia 
managed to reduce inequality over 
long periods, this success was not 
due to market forces, but rather to 
signiﬁ  cant government expenditures 
on rural development, education, and 
employment programs.
Labour
Rapid growth, rising education levels, 
and declining unemployment have 
pushed up real wages in all fast grow-
ing economies despite the weakness 
of organized labour (see Table 9). 
In Korea, real wages grew at average 
annual rates of 10 per cent and 8.2 
per cent over the periods 1970-1980 
and 1980-1992, respectively (World 
Bank, 1995: 175). In Taiwan, real 
wages grew by 6.0 per cent (comput-
Table 7. 
Selected Asian countries: Workforce 






South Korea (1980) 49
Taiwan (1980) 44
Thailand (1990) 83
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 10); Myers and Chalongphob (1991: 14)
Table 8. 
Selected Asian countries: Gross education 




1980s 2000 1980s 2000 1980s 2002
Chinaa 106.4 62.8 7.5
Hong Kong 106 100 74 na 13 na
Indonesia 119 110 48 57 7 14.6
Malaysia 102 98.7 57 70.3 7 28.2
Philippines 110 112.6 71 77.3 28 31.2
Singapore 111 97.5b 69 na 12 na
South Korea 104 101.1 87 94.1 37 77.6
Thailand (1990) 95 94.8 29 81.9 10 35.3
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 11); Myers and Chalongphob (1991: 14); 
ADB (2003).
Notes: a 1999; na - not available; b 1998.Growth with Equity in East Asia  9
ed from Deyo, 1989: 93) and 7.5 per 
cent (Lee, 1994: 16) over the periods 
1970-1980 and 1976-1986 respec-
tively. Although labour was harshly 
repressed in Korea and Taiwan until 
democratization in the late 1980s, ef-
forts to enhance labour productivity, 
product quality, and ﬁ  rms’ competi-
tiveness helped raise wages. Some of 
these trends also reduced occupa-
tional hierarchies and income diﬀ  er-
entials within enterprises. By the time 
unions grew in strength, real wages 
had already substantially risen.
Th   e growth of wage labour in Malaysia, Th   ailand and Indonesia intensiﬁ  ed following rapid export-
oriented manufacturing expansion during the 1970s and 1980s. Th   is also reduced disguised unemployment 
and raised household incomes. As Table 9 shows, during this decade, wage labour grew by annual average 
rates of 8.2 per cent in Malaysia and 6.6 per cent in South Korea and Th   ailand, with noteworthy increases in 
female participation (see Kamal and Young, 1985; McGee, 1986; Onchan, 1995; World Bank, 1993). Th  e 
migration of rural labour to urban industrial areas was pronounced enough to put upward pressure on wages.   
Th   e growing presence of foreign labour beginning in the early 1980s, commodity price declines, and 
union repression undermined improvements in real wages and working conditions in plantation agriculture 
in Malaysia (see Jomo, 1990; Jomo and Todd, 1994). However, inter-ethnic and other redistribution eﬀ  orts, 
the expansion of more remunerative employment (in particular the absorption of Bumiputera into the public 
sector), and manufacturing and modern service wage employment caused the Gini coeﬃ   cient for income in-
equality to decline to 0.474 in 1984; to 0.445 in 1990; and to 0.4607 in 2002 (see Table 5). Overall growth 
in wage employment and consequent increases in household incomes reduced poverty and inequality. 
Th   ere has also been less corporatism at the ﬁ  rm level in Malaysia, Th   ailand, and Indonesia in com-
parison to Taiwan and Korea. In export-oriented high-technology ﬁ  rms (semi-conductor ﬁ  rms, in particu-
lar), enterprise-level corporatism has involved mutually beneﬁ  cial cooperation between management and 
labour, but such enterprises tend to be much more exceptional in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, rising demand 
for skilled labour in Malaysia and Th   ailand substantially pushed up the wages of skilled workers (World 
Bank, 1995; Rasiah and Osman-Rani, 1995). Th   is increased wage diﬀ  erentials between skilled and unskilled 
labour, which was further undermined by labour imports.  
While unions and labour militancy have been treated unsympathetically, if not brutally, in all ﬁ  ve 
economies, the NICs of Malaysia, Th   ailand and Indonesia have experienced much worse wage and working 
conditions. Th   is is even in comparison to Korea and Taiwan, where labour protests are routinely suppressed. 
In Th   ailand and Indonesia, militant leaders have been beaten and murdered, unions weakened, and some-
times even destroyed (Narayanasamy, 1996). Collective bargaining rights for labour continue to be minimal 
in practice. Rising wages were mainly due to the exhaustion of labour reserves and technological deepening 
in a few export-oriented industries, but not union strength.
Table 9. 
Five HPAEs Wage employment growth 






1970 1983 1992a 2000 2002
China na na na 3.1 4
Indonesia na na 2 8 6.2 na
Malaysia 8.2 8 6 4.1 3.1 3.5
South Korea 6.6 na 4.1 2.4 4.5 3.1
Taiwan na 1.7 2.7 1.51 2.99 5.17
Thailand 6.6 na 2.9 3 3.6 2.2
Sources: World Bank (1995); Taiwan ﬁ  gures from Yu (1994: 6); Ragayah (2002b). 
Note: a 1991; na – not available.10  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Unlike Korea and Taiwan, industrial policy in Malaysia, Th   ailand and Indonesia emphasizes low 
production and labour costs, which suppress rapid wage growth and attract investment. On average, real 
wages grew by 2.0 per cent in Malaysia and 5.3 per cent in Indonesia over the 1970-1980 period, and by 2.3 
per cent and 4.3 per cent, respectively, over the 1980-1992 period (World Bank, 1995: 1974-1975). Real 
wages in Th   ailand grew by 2.0 per cent over the 1973-1981 and by 2.8 per cent from1981-1989 (Rasiah, 
1994: 210).
Besides poverty alleviation and redistribution mechanisms, the ﬁ  ve governments have to varying 
extents, introduced social safety nets to reduce the dislocation caused by rapid structural changes and cyclical 
inﬂ  uences. Th  e  eﬀ  ects of such instruments have however, been mixed. In Malaysia, the cost-of-living-allow-
ance (COLA) for workers is one such provision, but the unemployed do not qualify for it. Th   ere has been a 
pronounced tendency to minimize provisions on the presumption that full employment could be indeﬁ  nitely 
assured and that this would eliminate the need for ‘welfare’. It was also often claimed that the unemployed 
could always count on ‘traditional’ social safety nets provided by families, communities, and informal sector 
participation. Th   e social dislocations during the recessions following the 1997 East Asian ﬁ  nancial crises have 
underscored the inadequacy of such provisions and the need for formal safety nets. 
Summary
It is generally agreed that Korea and Taiwan were far more interventionist in the 1950s and 1960s than 
Malaysia and Th   ailand have been in recent decades. Income distribution was and remained better in 
Northeast Asia during periods of high growth while it has fared less well in Southeast Asia. Contrary to the 
Kuznets’ hypothesis, the cases of Korea and Taiwan suggest that lower inequality can be complementary to 
rapid growth in its early stages. Th   e Northeast Asian experiences suggest a strong case for intervention to 
improve asset distribution and to enhance human resources in order to generate rapid growth. With increas-
ing liberalization since the 1990s, income inequality in Taiwan and Korea began to worsen. Th   e Korean and 
Taiwanese experiences, however, have been rejected by the World Bank (1993) as special cases unsuitable for 
emulation by other developing countries.
Th   e cases of Malaysia and Th  ailand  oﬀ  er diﬀ  erent lessons. Th   e Malaysian economy remained largely 
laissez-faire until around 1970 with income distribution worsening in the 1960s (World Bank, 1995). After 
interventionist redistribution policies were adopted, growth, industrialization, and income distribution im-
proved in the next two decades, before deteriorating again in the 1990s with economic liberalization. While 
Th   ailand did not pursue redistribution policies or an explicit industrial policy, its income Gini coeﬃ   cient 
continued to rise.
Th   ese experiences suggest that poverty alleviation and the reduction of income inequality can not 
only accompany, but may even be conducive to rapid growth and industrialization. Income inequality how-
ever tends to worsen with economic liberalization, especially in the absence of eﬀ  ective provisions for redis-
tribution. Furthermore, the fact that income inequality in Taiwan and Korea declined in the initial stages of 
growth, and worsened as the two economies liberalized, turns the Kuznets hypothesis on its head. However, 
the unique circumstances of post-war asset redistribution (including land reforms) suggest that initial condi-
tions, rather than subsequent growth itself, may better explain these Northeast Asian exceptions.
Th   e next few sections examine the experiences of Th   ailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and China more 
closely, paying particular attention to the impacts of economic liberalization on inequality and poverty. Th  e 
eﬀ  ects of public policy and the role of education are also considered. Growth with Equity in East Asia  1 1
Thailand
Inequality
Th   ough poverty in Th   ailand declined markedly over the last four decades, income distribution actually wors-
ened (Pasuk and Isra, 2000: Table 3). Since 1962, when data ﬁ  rst became available, Th   ailand’s Gini coef-
ﬁ  cient continuously rose and peaked at 0.54 in 1992 (Rao, 1998: Table 9). Th   ere is no evidence supporting 
the World Bank’s claim of a dramatic decline in income inequality in Th   ailand (see Tables 10 and 11 using 
diﬀ  erent data sets or series).
Since the 1960s, income inequality generally deteriorated, as indicated by a rise in the Gini index 
from 0.453 in 1980-1981 to 0.531 in 1992 (Suganya and Somchai, 1988; Isra, 1995). Equality improved 
only in 1988, when agrarian prices were exceptionally high, and in recent years since 1992, i.e. after the 
World Bank’s (1993) study period. Full employment, economic diversiﬁ  cation with new agricultural and 
manufacturing exports, and increased tourism earnings have all raised earnings among low income groups. 
Between 1980-1981 and 1992, the share of income going to the top 10 per cent of the population rose 
steeply from 35 to 42 per cent (Pasuk and Isra, 2000: Table 29). Between the years of 1992 and 1998, this 
trend reversed (Table 12; Pasuk and 
Isra, 2000). Th   e Gini index improved 
slightly, declining to 0.508 in 1998, 
or roughly its level in the mid-1980s. 
Th   is reversal of trend most likely 
reﬂ  ected the country’s tight labour 
markets, as real wages in the formal 
sector quickly increased by the mid-
1990s. In 1999, the Gini index rose 
again to 0.53 (its 1992 level), suggest-
ing that recent improvements were 
reversed by the ﬁ  nancial crisis (World 
Bank, 2000). Th   e World Bank found 
Table 10. 
Thailand: Gini coefﬁ  cients, 1962-1992
Year Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
1962 0.41 - 0.41
1968 0.43 - 0.43
1975 0.42 0.43 0.42
1981 0.44 0.45 0.43
1986 0.47 0.5 0.47
1988 - 0.48 0.47
1990 - 0.5 0.49
1992 - 0.54 0.51
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 3); Suganya and Somchai (1988: Table 2.2); 
Isra (1999b: Table 7).
Table 11. 
Thailand: Per capita household income distribution, 1962-1998
Year












1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Quintile 1 2.9 3.4 2.4 6.1 5.4 4.6 4.9 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.3
Quintile 2 6.2 6.1 5.1 9.7 9.1 7.9 8.5 7.6 7.2 7.4 7.6 7.8
Quintile 3 10.5 10.4 9.7 14 13.4 12.1 12.4 11.7 11.2 11.7 11.9 11.9
Quintile 4 20.9 19.2 18.4 21 20.6 19.9 19.7 19.4 18.8 19.6 19.8 19.7
Quintile 5 59.5 60.9 64.4 49.3 51.5 55.6 54.5 56.9 58.7 57.1 56.5 56.3
Top  10%      35.4 39.2 37.8 40.4 42.3 40.6 40 39.8
Gini Index 0.456 0.482 0.535 0.426 0.453 0.5 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.51
Shorrocks  Index         1.58 1.76 1.49 1.28 1.11
Series I: Medhi (1977)
Series II: Suganya and Somchai (1988)
Series III: Isra (1999b), compatible with Series II
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 3); Suganya and Somchai (1988: Table 2.2); Isra (1999b: Table 7).12  DESA Working Paper No. 33
that the 1997-1998 crisis had the 
hardest impact on workers in small 
enterprises, wage earners below 24 
years old, and the less educated. 
Overall inequality increased 
between 1988 and 1992, and then 
declined until 1999, which was the 
ﬁ  rst recovery year following the ﬁ  -
nancial crisis. (It is worth noting that 
the East Asian crisis was preceded by 
a recession that reduced the income 
of the wealthy more than for others, 
thereby initially decreasing inequality. 
When the crisis actually hit, income 
inequality rose sharply.) During this 
entire period, non-farm proﬁ  ts made 
the largest contribution to changes in 
distribution (see Table 13). Between 
the years of 1988 and 1992, increas-
ing inequality in non-farm earnings 
contributed to 47 per cent of the 
total increase in inequality. Th  e  boom 
during this period almost doubled in-
equality in non-farm proﬁ  ts, thereby 
increasing overall inequality. From 
1992 to 1996, declining inequal-
ity in these same proﬁ  ts contributed 
to a 137 per cent overall decline in 
inequality. However, proﬁ  t levels generally declined and inequality in non-farm proﬁ  ts fell back to their 
1998 levels by the end of this latter period. During the 1992-1996 bubble, proﬁ  ts fell as wages and salaries 
continued rising due to full employment. 
Changes in farm proﬁ  ts had the second largest impact on inequality, increasing inequity before and 
after the boom. Inequality in farm proﬁ  ts increased steadily and signiﬁ  cantly, signifying widening disparity 
among farmers. Th   e gains from agricultural commercialization and agro-technological changes were not well 
shared among farmers in diﬀ  erent regions and agricultural sub-sectors. Some (e.g. small and medium farms 
operated by older farmers) were left behind while others gained disproportionately. 
Inequality in wages and salaries decreased between 1988 and 1992, and then rose sharply until 
1996. Th   is increase was most likely due to the spectacular high-level salaries of managers and profession-
als, particularly in the ﬁ  nance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sectors, during the height of the boom and 
bubble. Shifts among the various sources of income contributed greatly to income inequality during the ﬁ  rst 
period, but not in the second period. In the ﬁ  rst set of years, increases in the share of wages and salaries and 
the share of non-farm proﬁ  ts accounted for most of the 29 per cent rise in inequality. Also during this time-
frame, there was a pointed increase in manufacturing labour and a boom in FIRE. 
Table 12. 
Thailand: Gini coefﬁ  cient and quintiles 
of income inequality, 1975-2000
Year Gini Coef Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
1975 42.6 6.0 9.7 14.0 21.0 49.2
1981 44.2 5.5 9.3 13.7 21.1 50.4
1986 49.6 4.5 7.9 12.3 20.3 55.0
1988 48.9 4.6 8.0 12.4 20.6 54.5
1990 51.5 4.3 7.5 11.7 19.5 57.0
1992 53.6 4.0 7.1 11.1 18.8 59.1
1994 52.1 4.0 7.3 11.7 19.7 57.2
1996 51.6 4.1 7.5 11.8 19.9 56.7
1998 50.9 4.2 7.7 11.9 19.8 56.3
1999 53.1 3.8 7.1 11.4 19.4 58.2
2000 52.5 3.9 7.2 11.4 19.9 57.6
Source: Pasuk and Isra (2000).
Table 13. 
Thailand: Decomposition of changes in individual 
income inequality by income source, 1988-1996
1988-1992 1992-1996
Source Share Inequality Share Inequality
Total 29.05 70.95 -0.36 -99.64
Wages & salaries 12.84 -0.69 -1.29 31.07
Non-farm proﬁ  ts 37.01 46.69 7.53 -136.5
Farm proﬁ  ts -21 20.41 -9.21 21.7
Transfers -3.24 0.16 4.61 -5.12
Property incomes 3.12 1.8 -1.76 -5.31
Other money receipts 0.32 2.57 -0.23 -5.48
Source: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 20).Growth with Equity in East Asia  1 3
Th   ese shifts boosted the returns to capital and wages, raised business proﬁ  ts, and squeezed agri-
culture with higher costs. In the 1992-1996 period, when shares of the FIRE and manufacturing sectors 
remained almost constant, changes in income shares from various sources contributed almost nothing to the 
changes in overall inequality. Shifts in overall mean income were barely signiﬁ  cant, but positive in both pe-
riods. Th   is suggested that while growth tended to reduce inequality, its contribution was very small. Covari-
ance among diﬀ  erent income sources was not signiﬁ  cant. Although the study only covered a limited period, 
the results clearly showed that the main determinants of inequality in Th   ailand before the crisis were business 
proﬁ  t levels and returns to agriculture.
Orakoch (1999) found that 95 per cent of overall (individual) income inequality can be explained 
by inequality (among individuals living or working) in the same region or community, or economic sector. 
Moreover, the contribution of such ‘within-group’ inequality increased slightly between 1988 and 1996. 
Hence, the contribution of income disparities among regions, communities and economic sectors—which 
explained only around 5 per cent of overall inequality—decreased correspondingly over this period. Th  us, 
the distribution of development beneﬁ  ts became more balanced between 1988 and 1996. Inequality among 
diﬀ  erent communities, regions or sectors decreased compared to inequality within the same community, 
region or sector (Pasuk and Isra, 2000). Meanwhile, however, regional disparities have been increasing, espe-
cially between Bangkok and other regions (Isra, 1999). 
Despite the government’s introduction of a minimum wage policy in 1973, the minimum wage has 
not signiﬁ  cantly impacted the labour market. In 1996, only 26 per cent of workers were protected by mini-
mum wage regulation. During the ﬁ  nancial crisis, real wages proved highly ﬂ  exible, suggesting that the mini-
mum wage law had not introduced much rigidity. Average real wages in the formal sector rose by less than 2 
per cent per annum between 1982 and 1991, but then surged to 10 per cent during the 1991-1994 period. 
From 1990 to 1995, real wages increased by approximately 30 per cent for the workforce as a whole, and by 
48 per cent for those in manufacturing (Pasuk and Isra, 2000: Table 20). Th   e wage diﬀ  erentials among work-
ers with diﬀ  erent education levels were still very signiﬁ  cant in 1995 (Pasuk and Isra, 2000: Table 24).  
In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, industrial protection and concentration in Bangkok and its vicinity 
increased sectoral and regional inequality. Growing inequality due to trade protection policies outweighed 
any countervailing eﬀ  ects of industrial decentralization policies and the promotion of small-scale industries. 
Resources were allocated in favour of manufacturing, banking, and ﬁ  nance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) 
sectors at the expense of agriculture. Th   is increased inequality between agricultural and non-agricultural in-
comes, as well as between rural and urban populations. Continued high industrial concentration in Bangkok 
and the surrounding area reinforced regional inequalities. Th   roughout this period, urban-rural inequality 
rose. Pasuk and Isra (2000) cite studies that suggest that protection had regressive impacts on income distri-
bution in Th   ailand, while Suphanee (1995) and Chalongphob and others (1999) show that trade taxes had 
been regressive in impact.3
3  According to Pasuk and Isra (2000), Fabers and Kennes study, based on a multi-sectoral macro-economic model, 
show that a reduction in the rates of import tariﬀ  s increases the share of agriculture in GDP signiﬁ  cantly. Isra uses 
a computer generated equilibrium (CGE) model to show that the structure of industrial protection in Th  ailand  has 
favoured urban households, particularly those in the upper expenditure classes. Studies by Pairote (1975), Paitoon and 
others (1989) as well as Sunee and Sombat (1997) show the impact of the protective structures in the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s on the sectoral and regional bias of protection.14  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Income disparities among economic sectors and regions have been growing. Agriculture has 42 per 
cent of the population, but only 10 per cent of GDP. Industry has 21 per cent of the labour force but ac-
counts for 41 per cent of output, while services account for 37 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. Region-
al disparities have also grown in recent years. In 2004, Bangkok, with 17 per cent of Th  ailand’s  population, 
accounted for 44 per cent of GDP, while the rest of the Central region (excluding Bangkok) had another 17 
per cent of the population and 27 per cent of output. With 14 per cent of the population, the South had 
9 per cent of GDP, while the mountainous North had 18 per cent of the population and also 9 per cent of 
output. Meanwhile, the Northeast had 34 per cent of the population, but only 11 per cent of output (Kasian 
2006: 11, f.n. 4). 
Improvements in income distribution have also been associated with favourable agricultural prices, 
suggesting that policies that enhanced rural incomes also improved the overall distribution of income. While 
non-agricultural wage employment growth reduced poverty by raising the incomes of the employed, it may 
also have raised overall inequality. Th   e equalizing eﬀ  ects of the growth of labour-intensive export-oriented 
industries may not be strong enough to counter either pre-existing structural inequalities or new sources 
of inequality. Th   erefore, policies required to check growing inequality should include: better educational 
policies and access; better social security provisions; agricultural growth; progressive ﬁ  scal policies; and more 
equitable social expenditures. 
Th  e  Th   ai government has not made use of ﬁ  scal policy or other measures to redistribute income 
progressively. Th   e bulk of government revenue came from regressive indirect taxes (sales taxes and tariﬀ  s), 
suggesting a regressive tax structure. In the 1960s and 1970s, ﬁ  scal policies were clearly regressive and most 
likely exacerbated inequality due to regressive revenue, especially tax trends. Th   ough personal and corporate 
income taxes were progressive between 1986 and 1994, indirect taxes, which accounted for the majority of 
total revenue, were regressive. Th   e tax on rice exports (abolished in 1985) also increased the urban-rural gap. 
Inequality and social services
Th   e government’s expenditure on education, health and other social services could not counter the regres-
sive eﬀ  ects of other ﬁ  scal policies and may not even have been all that progressive. Government expenditure 
on education, health, and services has not grown as much as other expenditure items, and has been urban 
biased. Myers and Chalongphob (1991) showed that the government did not seek to transfer income to the 
poor via social services or other public expenditure, while Medhi (1980) also concluded that the government 
did not try to use ﬁ  scal policies to improve income distribution. Chalongphob and others (1999) found that 
well-to-do households received proportionately larger shares of the direct beneﬁ  ts of expenditures on educa-
tion, public health, and infrastructure in agriculture, transport and communications. Although wealthier 
households bore a larger burden of the taxes, they also gained more than the poor. Th   us, the overall impact 
of tax and expenditure policies in the 1980s and early 1990s probably increased inequality.
Th   ailand also did not have social policies that adequately protected workers from economic ﬂ  uc-
tuations. As a result, younger, rural, and less educated employees of small enterprises felt the worst impacts 
of the 1997-1998 crisis, which most severely burdened the poor.4 Only a small percentage of the work-
ers received compensation for layoﬀ  s, and no unemployment insurance was available. Ad hoc attempts at 
providing social safety nets post crisis were not very successful, as the government lacked the machinery and 
4 Th   ai society has several informal social safety nets, such as the extended family, informal credit networks, community 
projects, charity in Buddhist temples and among ethnic Chinese clan groups, associations and foundations. Without 
these informal social safety nets, poverty incidence and income distribution may have been worse.Growth with Equity in East Asia  1 5
experience to institute such measures.5 Government regulations and policies designed to assist workers, such 
as the minimum wage, social security, and severance pay, were not widely observed or implemented among 
poorer wage labourers. Employment generation programs mainly beneﬁ  ted the more aﬄ   uent workers. 
Access to education has 
also been very unequal (see Tables 
14 and 15) and has not improved 
signiﬁ  cantly over time (Myers and 
Chalongphob, 1991). Inequality in 
access to educational opportunities 
higher than secondary school most 
likely worsened income distribution 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
Households with incomes below 
the poverty line in 1986, 1990, and 
1994 received very low shares (14-
23 per cent) of the direct beneﬁ  ts of 
government education expenditure, 
compared to households above the 
poverty line (75-86 per cent). Th  is 
inequality increased over time. Th  e 
pattern of government educational 
expenditure thus reinforced existing 
inequality (Chalongphob and others, 
1999). Low secondary school enrol-
ment ratios and the high share of the 
workforce limited to a primary education constrained productivity, value-added growth and equality (Myers 
and Chalongphob, 1991). Learning by doing, on-the-job training, and other training policies adopted for 
lowly educated workers, could not overcome the legacy of insuﬃ   cient and unequal access to education.
During the mid-1980s, as Th   ailand became more committed to export-oriented industrialization, 
the government began to address inequality in access to education. Secondary school enrolment doubled 
between 1990 and 1997, when it reached over 60 per cent.6 However, dropouts from secondary schools 
5 Th   e government extended the severance pay requirements from six to ten months (for employees with more than ten 
years experience); set up a fund to make severance payments to workers whose ﬁ  rms had gone bankrupt; extended the 
social security beneﬁ  ts for laid oﬀ   subscribers from six to twelve months, while the tripartite contribution rate for such 
beneﬁ  ts was reduced by one-third; launched a major rural job-creation program in March 1999, and then continued 
in 2000, to absorb returning migrants; launched training programs to upgrade the skills of workers laid oﬀ   during the 
crisis, through free short-term vocational and technical training with subsequent job placement. But the government 
also decided not to launch an unemployment insurance scheme as a long-term response to the crisis, ostensibly for fear 
of its ﬁ  scal burden.
Th   e World Bank (2000) argued that unemployment insurance schemes are not feasible or equitable for labour markets 
characterized by relatively small formal sectors. Yet, a detailed feasibility study conducted by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in 1998 concluded that an unemployment insurance scheme in Th   ailand, phased in over three 
years, would be aﬀ  ordable and administratively feasible (World Bank 2000). 
6  In 1987, 69 per cent of children surveyed did not go to secondary school for ﬁ  nancial reasons. Ten per cent of them 
said they had to work, and only 11 per cent reported no interest in further studies. Since 1996, the government has 
promoted education by providing low-interest loans for education at all levels. Th   e number of students receiving these 
loans increased from 148,444 in 1996 to 881,835 in 1999.
Table 14. 
Thailand: Employed labour force by education, 1975-2000 
(percentages)
 1975 1987 1999 2000
Less than elementary 11 6.3 3.9 3.42
Elementary 82.3 77.6 65.3 65
Secondary 3.7 7.8 17.1 18.27
Vocational 0.9 2.7 3.2 3
Teachers’ college 1.1 2.4 2.2 1.9
University and equivalent 0.4 2.8 8.2 8.39
Others and not known 0.5 0.4 0 0.02
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 9); Th   ailand National Statistical Oﬃ   ce, 
Report of the Labour Force Survey (various years).
Table 15. 
Thailand: Gross enrolment ratios at secondary and tertiary levels 
for children from households of different occupations, 1985 
(percentages)
  Secondary ratio Tertiary ratio
Population 
distribution
Professions and business 95.8 57.7 12.8
Labourers 24.2 7.1 21.3
Farmers 14.5 1.7 65.9
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 12); Myers and Chalongphob (1991: 15).16  DESA Working Paper No. 33
remained high and increased during the economic crisis. Government spending on education is still biased 
towards the tertiary level, even though increases at the secondary and vocational levels would have a more 
favourable impact on income distribution (Isra, 1995).
Poverty
Overall, Th   ailand has been much more successful in reducing poverty than in making social provisions. In 
1997, for example, the country ranked 58th out of 174 countries in terms of GDP per capita, but 88th 
in terms of the social (non-income) components of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
human development index (UNDP, 1997). Since 1975-1976, poverty incidence has been calculated using 
the nutritional adequacy method. Th  e  ﬁ  rst calculation in 1975-1976 found 30 per cent below the line. Th  is 
was slightly less than the 33 per cent calculated using another method for the same year (Tables 16 and 17). 
Although there have been several recalculations since, resulting in a number of slightly incompatible series, 
the overall trend has been clear. Poverty fell rapidly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, remained rather static 
through the 1980s, and then fell rapidly during the 1990s to six per cent in 1998. Non-income measures 
of poverty conﬁ  rm the trend. Infant mortality and maternal mortality rates decreased signiﬁ  cantly over the 
1980s (Pasuk and Isra, 2000: Table 16). During 1980-1985, life expectancy was 60 years for males and 66 for 
females, and by 2010-2015, it was projected to increase to approximately 69 for males and 73 for females.
Th  e  signiﬁ  cant decline in poverty levels in the 1960s and 1970s (see Tables 17, 18 and 19 summa-
rizing diﬀ  erent data sets) may be explained by the eﬀ  ects of the expansion in cultivated land. Th  is  occurred 
until the early 1980s, when wage employment in manufacturing and other non-agricultural sectors expanded 
as a result of industrialization mainly based on import substitution. Th   e decline in poverty stagnated over the 
1980s, but then picked up in the early 1990s, with the acceleration of export-oriented industrialization. 
Within ﬁ  ve years, 20 per 
cent of the labour force had trans-
ferred out of agriculture. Th  e  tight 
labour market pushed up real wages 
rapidly, and some of this ﬂ  owed back 
to rural areas as remittances, helping 
to reduce poverty. Poverty incidence 
increased from 23 per cent in 1980-
1981 to nearly 30 per cent in 1985-
Table 16. 
Thailand: Poverty incidence by household consumption function 
methodology, 1962/1963-1998 (percentages)
 1962-1963 1968-1969 1975-1976 1981 1990 1998
Thailand 57 42 33 31 27.2 12.9
Bangkok 28 11 12 4
Urban 38 25 22 21 6.9 1.5
Rural 61 45 37 35 33.8 17.2
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 14); ADB (2003).
Table 17. 
Thailand: Poverty incidence using nutritional adequacy methodology, 1975/1976-1998
 
Series I Series II Series III
1975/1976 1981 1986 1988 1988 1990 1992 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Entire Kingdom 30 23 29.5 21.2 22.8 18.6 13.7 20.1 14.5 11.5 6.4 6.1
Bangkok 7.8 3.9 3.5 3.5 4.1 2.3 1.2 2 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.4
Municipal 12.5 7.5 5.9 6.1 6.1 5.4 2.5 18.3 11.6 10.5 6.1 6
Sanitary district 14.8 13.5 18.6 12.2 29.6 25.8 17.2
Village 36.2 27.3 35.8 26.3 26.3 20.7 15.7 23 16.9 13.1 7.3 7
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 15) from Series I: Suganya and Somchai (1988); Series II: Medhi (1996, 1999), prices 
adjusted; Series III: Isra (1999), recalculated; municipal and sanitary district amalgamated as ‘urban’.Growth with Equity in East Asia  1 7
1986, and then declined to 22 per 
cent in 1988 due to better agricul-
tural prices (Suganya and Somchai, 
1988; Isra, 1995). Poverty fell more 
rapidly during the economic boom, 
from 22 per cent in 1988 to 6 per 
cent a decade later (Pasuk and Isra, 
2000: Table 27). 
All regions beneﬁ  ted from 
poverty reduction, though not equally 
(Table 19). Until the late 1980s, 
poverty incidence dropped much 
faster in urban than in rural areas. By 
1981, the characteristics of the poor 
were very clear: 90 per cent lived in 
villages; 80 per cent were involved 
in agriculture; and 98 per cent only 
had an elementary education or less 
(Suganya and Somchai, 1988; Medhi, 
1996; Begemeier and Hoﬀ  man, 
1988). Over the 1990s, poverty fell 
slightly faster in rural areas compared 
to urban areas (see Table 20). Th  is 
was mainly because of out-migra-
tion and remittances by urban wage 
labour. Th   e northeast remained the 
poorest area not only because of 
unfavourable resource endowments, especially low rainfall and poor soil, but also due to low investment in 
productive capital (irrigation) and human capital (Isra, 1995; Suganya and Somchai, 1988).
Table 18. 
Thailand: Poverty incidence by region, 1962-1981
 
 
Series I Series II
1962/1963 1968/1969 1975/1976 1980/1981
Poverty  line  (baht)     
Rural    1,981 3,454
Urban    2,961 5,151
Poverty  incidence  (%)     
Thailand 57 39 30 23
North 65 38 33.2 21.5
Northeast 74 68 44.9 35.9
Central 40 18 12.9 13.5
South 44 40 30.7 20.4
Bangkok 28 11 7.7 3.9
Rural 61 45 36.1 27.3
Urban 38 25 12.5 7.5
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 5); Medhi (1996); Pranee (1995).
Table 19. 
Thailand: Poverty incidence by region, 1962-1998
Series I Series II Series III
1962/1963 1968/1969 1975/1976 1980/1981 1987/1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Total 57 39 30 23 24 20 15 11 6 6
North 65 38 33 22 23 18 15 11 6 6
Northeast 74 68 45 36 37 31 24 18 10 9
Central 40 18 13 14 16 14 7633
South 44 40 31 20 22 20 13 13 7 8
Bangkok (outskirts) 28 11 8432 1100
Rural 61 45 36 27 29 23 17 13 7 7
Urban 38 25 13 8 7 12 8744
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 17); Pranee (1995); Isra (1999). 
Table 20. 
Thailand: Urban/rural distribution of 
population and poverty, 1990-1998
Areas 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Share of Population
Rural 74.1 74.8 71.6 72.2 71.7
Urban 25.9 25.2 28.4 27.8 28.3
Share of Poverty 
Rural 84.7 86.9 82.1 82.6 82
Urban 15.3 13.1 17.9 17.4 18
Sources: Pasuk and Isra (2000: Table 28). Data calculated from Household 
Socioeconomic Survey, by Th   ailand National Statistical Oﬃ   ce.18  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Indonesia
Inequality
Th   e World Bank contends that inequality in Indonesia declined from a Gini Coeﬃ   cient of 0.4 in the 1970s 
to 0.3 in the 1980s. Given the absence of reliable data on Indonesia’s income distribution until recently, it is 
likely that this claim is based on expenditure trends. Rao (1998) notes that signiﬁ  cant reductions in absolute 
poverty since the early 1970s would be manifested in narrowing consumption gaps and declining expendi-
ture inequality, especially since the ostentatious consumption of the rich is barely reﬂ  ected in most house-
hold expenditure surveys. More importantly, such a reduction in expenditure inequality (see Table 21) would 
not necessarily imply reduced income inequality. Hence, he argues, it is not entirely clear that economic 
inequality went down as much as asserted by the World Bank. He notes, for instance, the lack of any signiﬁ  -
cant reduction in the relevant Gini coeﬃ   cients between 1976 and 1993 (Rao, 1998: Table 7).
In the mid-1960s, Gini 
coeﬃ   cients were estimated at around 
0.34 in urban areas and 0.35 in rural 
areas. By 1978, the urban Gini coef-
ﬁ  cient increased to 0.38, while rural 
measures of inequality declined to 
0.34. For all of Indonesia, the Gini 
coeﬃ   cient increased from approxi-
mately 0.35 in the mid-1960s to 
0.38 in 1978. Worsening Gini coef-
ﬁ  cients from 1970 to 1980 suggest 
that rapid economic development 
during this period involved rising 
urban inequality. 
Th   e 1970s oil boom and 
rapid appreciation of the rupiah in 
real terms had negative impacts on 
non-oil exporters and producers, 
especially in the agricultural sector. While rice was protected through import controls and various producer 
subsidies, smallholder producers of other agricultural commodities, such as rubber, cocoa, and tea, suﬀ  ered 
from adverse terms of trade trends. Th   e sharp increase in rice prices during the early 1970s helped rice pro-
ducers, but adversely aﬀ  ected the rice consumers that accounted for the majority of society.
In the early 1970s, during the oil boom, non-agricultural real wages rose very steeply, by 12.3 
per cent per annum for textiles, and by 15 per cent for the civil service. Agricultural real wages remained 
unchanged and rural poverty reduction was slower than in urban areas. Interestingly, general agricultural 
productivity, especially rice output, only increased in the oil boom years of the late 1970s, possibly due to 
increased investments ﬁ  nanced by oil rents. Since the late 1970s, wage inequalities appear to have declined 
in agriculture, manufacturing, and urban and rural areas (Table 22).
Since the 1970s, wages have increased rapidly, even though real wage growth was somewhat lower 
but more uniform than in the previous decade. Th   e growth of real wages for women was also impressive. In 
Table 21. 
Indonesia: Household expenditure Gini coefﬁ  cients, 1964-2000
Year Urban Rural Overall
1964-1965 0.34 0.35 0.35
1969-1970 0.33 0.34 0.35
1976 0.35 0.31 0.34
1978 0.38 0.34 0.38
1980 0.36 0.31 0.34
1981 0.33 0.29 0.33
1984 0.32 0.28 0.33
1987 0.32 0.26 0.32
1990 0.34 0.25 0.32
1993 0.33 0.26 0.34
1996 0.36 0.27 0.36
1997 na na 0.38
1998 na na 0.37
1999 na na 0.31
2000 na na 0.3
Sources: Tubagus (2000a: Table 3.3); Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics; Booth 
(2000); Data for 1997 and 1998: World Bank (2000); ADB (2003).Growth with Equity in East Asia  1 9
agriculture, manufacturing, services, 
and even construction, monthly 
wages for women rose faster than for 
men. After increasing by more than 
10 per cent per annum in the 1970s, 
the real wages of civil servants were 
relatively stagnant in the 1980s and 
1990s. Economic deregulation, trade 
liberalization and booming exports 
increased wages very sharply as the 
labour market tightened. 
Oﬀ  -farm employment and income failed to reduce rural income inequalities as they had in the 
1970s. Instead, rural incomes continued to decline relative to the national average, and their fall was sharper 
for agricultural labourer households (Booth, 2000). Th   is trend clearly worsened income distribution. Th  e 
decline in government oil revenues in the mid to late 1980s reduced agricultural development spending. Th  e 
rice self-suﬃ   ciency program, which required massive subsidies, was no longer sustainable.
During the 1980’s recession, the growth of agricultural real wages was very high, and the Gini coef-
ﬁ  cient declined from 0.36 to 0.32 in urban areas, and from 0.31 to 0.26 in rural areas by 1987. Th  is  period 
between the late 1970s to the late 
1980s was characterized by rural-ur-
ban migration, and by a transition 
from protected import substitution 
to an export oriented growth strategy. 
Akita, Lukman, and Yamada (1999) 
show increasing expenditure inequali-
ties associated with rapid growth 
during this timeframe. Th  ey  reported 
increased inequality, especially in 
urban areas, between 1987 and 1993. 
Urban-rural inequality had a greater 
eﬀ  ect on overall national inequal-
ity than inter-provincial disparities. 
While there have been larger inter-
provincial GDP gaps, inter-provin-
cial expenditure inequality was less 
signiﬁ  cant. 
Akita, Lukman, and Yamada 
(1999) argued that education deter-
mined expenditure inequality (see 
Table 23), where between the years 
of 1987 and 1993, the expenditure 
of the more educated grew faster 
than those with less schooling. Th  ey 
Table 22. 
Indonesia: Wages Gini coefﬁ  cients, 1977-1992
Sector 1977 1982 1987 1992
Agriculture 38 35 34 33
Non-agriculture na na na na
Urban 46 39 36 37
Rural 46 41 35 32
Manufacturing 48 45 38 38
Urban 48 40 37 39
Rural 43 44 34 31
Sources: Tubagus (2000b: Table 3.5); Manning (1988).
Table 23. 
Indonesia: Wage income differentials by schooling, 1987-1994
 
Male Female
1987 1990 1994 1987 1990 1994
Primary school 100 100 100 100 100 100
Lower secondary 133 120 126 176 161 147
Upper secondary
General 166 175 167 248 228 237
Vocational 167 171 176 272 253 270
Tertiary 291 300 322 430 401 424
Manufacturing
Primary school 100 100 100 100 100 100
Lower secondary 121 122 120 143 136 135
Upper secondary
General 174 167 161 248b 197 188
Vocational 164 171 160 226b 196 163
Tertiary 340 447 400 520b 439b 471
Servicesa
Primary school 100 100 100 100 100 100
Lower secondary 124 119 124 182 178 156
Upper secondary
General 144 157 151 227 222 263
Vocational 152 158 163 257 265 327
Tertiary 248 236 244 373 368 427
Sources: Tubagus (2000b): Table 3.6); Manning (1998).
Notes: Primary school = 100; a: Government, community and personal services; 
b: 10-99 cases in category.20  DESA Working Paper No. 33
showed that from 1987 to 1993 within-group inequalities increased for households with higher education 
and remained the same for households with elementary or junior high school education. In other words, 
expenditure inequalities among people with higher education increased during this period. However, income 
inequality with respect to education declined from 1987 to 1994, meaning that those with less education 
experienced faster increases in earnings compared to those with more education.
In later years, the 1997-1998 ﬁ  nancial crisis reduced inequality, as the Gini coeﬃ   cient declined from 
0.38 in 1997 to 0.37 in 1998 and to 0.30 in 2000 (World Bank, 2000; ADB, 2003). During the crisis, the 
rich reduced their expenditures more than the poor. Personal consumption expenditure declined by less than 
3 per cent compared with the overall economic contraction of almost 14 per cent in 1998. Th   e crisis was 
marked by massive declines in real wages, but only relatively small increases in unemployment. Th   e crisis hit 
urban centres more than rural areas, coming down hardest on Jakarta and West Java, which had grown the 
fastest during the early 1990s.
Poverty
Table 24 shows the reduction of In-
donesian poverty between 1976 and 
1998. By 1976, absolute poverty in-
cidence had declined to 38.8 per cent 
in urban areas and to 40.4 per cent in 
rural areas. At this time, around 54 
million people still lived below the 
poverty line. 
Poverty reduction was un-
even between urban and rural areas 
in the early 1970s. While poverty 
incidence declined sharply in urban 
areas from 54 to 39 per cent, rural 
poverty increased slightly from 39 to 40 per cent. In other words, people in the urban areas and in the oil 
related sectors seemed to beneﬁ  t more than those living in the countryside. Th   is trend changed during the 
late 1970s, when the incidence of rural poverty fell (40 to 26.5 per cent) more rapidly than in urban areas 
(39 to 28 per cent). While absolute poverty signiﬁ  cantly declined for all areas of the country throughout the 
1970s, relative poverty waned more slowly, with faster reductions in absolute and relative terms, for the rural 
poor between the years of 1970 and 1980.7  
Th   e program to achieve rice self-suﬃ   ciency in the early 1980s signiﬁ  cantly reduced rural poverty. It 
included heavy agricultural subsidies, rice price stabilization, and high protection. Indonesia achieved rice 
self-suﬃ   ciency in 1984. More importantly, the government channelled its oil revenues to rice agriculture, 
and the rice program was favourable to the poor, for both producers and consumers. Large investments in 
rural infrastructure reduced production and marketing costs for farmers and boosted returns to rice agricul-
tural investments. Th   us, the real purchasing power of all households increased directly. However, these mas-
sive public outlays became a major ﬁ  scal problem when oil revenues declined in the 1980s.
7  Relative poverty measures the percentage of the population earning or spending below a certain percentage (say 33 or 
50 per cent) of the average per-capita income or consumption expenditure (see Tubagus, 2000: Table 3.2).
Table 24. 
Indonesia: Rates of absolute poverty, 1976-1998
As a percentage of the population Millions of people
Year Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
1976 38.8 40.4 40.1 10 44.2 54.2
1980 29 28.4 28.6 9.5 32.8 42.3
1987 20.1 16.1 17.4 9.7 20.3 30
1990 16.8 14.3 15.1 9.4 17.8 27.2
1993 13.4 13.8 13.7 8.7 17.2 25.9
1996 9.7 12.3 11.3 7.2 15.3 22.5
1998 BPSa 21.9 25.7 24.2 17.6 31.9 49.5
World Bankb 20.3 41.5
Sources: Tubagus (2000b: Table 3.1); Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics.
Notes: a: using new standards, BPS is Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics 
(Badan Pusat Statistik); b: using consistent estimates.Growth with Equity in East Asia  2 1
Improvements in infrastructure also reduced poverty during the early 1980s. Th   e poor were able 
to migrate more easily in search of better work opportunities at a time when a more ﬂ  exible labour market 
encouraged labour mobility. New land settlement, increased rural oﬀ  -farm activities as well as other rural 
activities such as increased logging also created new employment in rural areas. Oﬀ  -farm employment and 
incomes increased signiﬁ  cantly, which helped increase and diversify the sources of income for those living in 
the countryside. 
Rapid economic development in Indonesia in the last three decades, and especially since the mid-
1980s, signiﬁ  cantly reduced absolute poverty in both urban and rural areas. However, household consump-
tion inequality trends, as measured by Gini ratios, were mixed. During the ﬁ  rst oil boom (1970s), increased 
output of non-tradables increased urban inequity. Rapid rural economic development signiﬁ  cantly raised 
rural incomes. Both poverty and inequality declined until the mid-1980s. Rapid economic development dur-
ing this period did not seem to adversely impact income distribution. Th   ough rapid economic growth during 
the mid-1980s was associated with declining poverty, improvements were smaller compared to the previous 
decade, partly because poverty was more heterogeneous and scattered. Meanwhile, the Gini ratio increased, 
especially in urban areas. As in the 1970s, consumption growth in urban, modern, and capital-intensive sec-
tors tended to be faster than in rural sectors. Also, the expenditure of those with higher education increased 
faster than for the less educated.  
Rapid economic liberalization during the late 1980s and early 1990s appeared to be accompanied 
by economic growth and continued poverty reduction. From 1987 to 1996, absolute poverty declined 
from about 20 to 10 per cent in urban areas and from 16 to 12 per cent in rural areas (see Table 24). Rural 
poverty also continued to decline 
from 1987 to 1996, but much more 
slowly than between the years of 1978 
and 1987. Slower poverty reduction 
during the 1990s era of rapid growth 
might have also been due to the vari-
ous pockets of poverty in the country 
that were bypassed by such growth. 
Th   ough poverty was reduced, in-
equality increased, which meant that 
the beneﬁ  ts of more rapid economic 
growth had not been equally shared. 
Inequality rose in both rural and 
urban areas, but was more apparent 
in urban centres such as Jakarta and 
urban West Java (see Tables 25 and 
26). Th   e Gini coeﬃ   cient in both 
urban and rural areas increased from 
0.32 to 0.36 between 1987 and 1996, 
and continued to rise until just before 
the crisis. Th   ese data point to a trend 
of rising inequality during the 1990s’ 
era of liberalization and rapid growth. 
Table 25. 
Indonesia: Relative poverty estimates, 1970-1996
Percentage of the population spending below 50 per cent 
of average per-capita consumption expenditure:
Year Urban Rural Overall (urban + rural)
1970 20.8 21.9 22.9
1980 22.6 16.7 20.5
1984 18.8 13.5 19.0
1987 18.1 10.0 17.0
1990 20.2 10.3 16.0
1993 19.8 9.5 18.5
1996 23.2 11.8 21.2
Percentage of the population spending below 30 per cent
of average per-capita consumption expenditure:
Year Urban Rural Overall (urban + rural)
1970 7.2 7.9 8.1
1980 6.6 4.5 5.9
1984 4.9 3.7 4.0
1987 4.4 0.8 2.9
1990 4.1 2.3 2.4
1993 4.8 1.3 3.0
1996 6.0 1.2 5.0
Sources: Tubagus (2000b: Table 3.2); Booth (2000).22  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Rapid economic develop-
ment and poverty reduction took 
place despite limited social safety 
nets and income transfer programs. 
Tax collection was also generally low 
and ineﬀ  ective. Despite such uncer-
tainties, investments in primary and 
lower secondary education seems to 
have had strong impacts on poverty 
reduction and equity improvement. 
Th   us, rapid growth in Indonesia from 
1987 to 1996 was accompanied by 
reduced poverty in absolute terms, 
but not by improved equity, especially 
in urban areas. Growing inequality, 
especially in urban centres, was not 
because poor or rural people did not beneﬁ  t from the booming economy, but because the rich beneﬁ  ted 
far more. Another reason for growing inequity was the absence of eﬀ  ective and progressive income transfer 
programs. Besides the regressive nature of the tax system, the social security system and government social 
spending have also been abused by politicians as well as other military and government oﬃ   cials.
Th   e Indonesian economy grew at an average annual rate of 7 per cent between 1975 and 1996. 
During this period, overall poverty dropped by 82 per cent, and rural poverty declined from 33.9 to 14.3 per 
cent (ADB, 1997: 190: Table 3.3). Th   e proportion of people living in absolute poverty stood at 11.3 per cent 
in 1996. With the beginning of the economic crisis in 1997 and the sudden reversal of conﬁ  dence and capi-
tal inﬂ  ows, the economy contracted by 14 per cent, inﬂ  ation rose by 80 per cent, the rupiah depreciated by 
more than 75 per cent, and real wages fell by more than 30 per cent in 1998. Th   us, GDP growth fell from 
around 7 per cent per annum before 1998 to -14.3 per cent in 1998.
All estimates indicate a rapid rise in poverty incidence during the ﬁ  nancial crisis (Dhanani and Is-
lam, 2000). Th   e World Bank (2000) notes that “a large swath of the Indonesian population that is today ‘not 
poor’ is nevertheless at risk of becoming poor… between 30 and 60 per cent of households are vulnerable 
to poverty over a three year horizon.” Th   e Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) estimates suggest that poverty 
incidence rose from 19 per cent in February 1996 to 37 per cent in September 1998 at the height of the 
crisis, before declining to 23 per cent in February 1999. While poverty undoubtedly rose during the crisis, 
the increase was perhaps not as much as initially feared. According to the World Bank (2000), the number of 
poor increased from 11 per cent in 1996 to about 19 per cent in August 1999 (also see Figure 1). 
Th   e increased poverty, due to inﬂ  ation as well as recession (income loss), was more marked in urban 
areas than in the countryside. Between February 1996 and February 1999, the number falling below a 
reduced ‘extreme poverty’ line, deﬁ  ned as of 65 per cent of the oﬃ   cial poverty line, increased by over 70 per 
cent (Dhanani and Islam, 2000). More recent data suggest that urban poverty has dropped back to the pre-
crisis level, though the rural index remains above the pre-crisis mark. While the over-all school enrolment 
ratio and dropout rates did not seem to have changed very dramatically in the short-run, the impact of the 
crisis on poorer and more vulnerable communities, especially females and children, was more severe (Chow-
Table 26. 
Indonesia: Relative poverty by region, 1987 and 1996
Proportion of population spending below half of average per-capita expenditure
Areas 1987 1996
Urban Areas 18.1 23.2
Jakarta 13.9 22.1
West Java 16.9 23.9
Central Java 13.3 15.2
East Java 18.3 16.4
North Sumatera 12.5 13.8
South Sumatera 11.0 15.7
South Sulawesi 12.8 16.0
Rural Areas 10.0 11.8
All Indonesia 17.0 21.2
Sources: Tubagus (2000b: Table 3.4); Booth (2000).Growth with Equity in East Asia  2 3
dhury, 2001). Th  e  eﬀ  ect of the crisis on poverty has certainly been varied. Poverty is chronic in remote areas 
and is unlikely to be aﬀ  ected by aggregate economic growth. More targeted polices, such as those implied by 
the social safety net approach, may be diﬃ   cult to implement because of weak bureaucracies, limited institu-
tional capacities, and ambiguous decentralization processes. 
Evidence also suggests that income inequality fell during the economic crisis (see Figure 2). How-
ever, Skouﬁ  as, Suryahadi, and Sumarto (2000) suggest that such ﬁ  ndings fail to distinguish between nominal 
Figure 1:
















Source: Indonesia Central Bureau 
of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik 
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poverty lines to reﬂ  ect current 
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inequality and changes in income distribution adjusted for the diﬀ  erential impact of inﬂ  ation on households. 
Also, more recent data suggest that any possible decline in nominal inequality during the crisis had been 
reversed by mid-1999 (Chowdhury, 2001). 
According to the UNDP, Indonesia’s human development index (HDI) increased from 0.465 in 
1975 to 0.670 in 1998, while the sharp drop in HDI in 1999 was primarily due to the decline in purchas-
ing power (see Figure 3). Meanwhile, its human poverty index (HPI) dropped from 0.34 in 1990 to 0.24 in 
1997. Figure 4 shows that the non-income components of HDI remained unaﬀ  ected by the 1998 recession. 
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Life expectancy at birth rose from 41 years in 1960 to 66.2 years in 1999. Over the same period, the infant 
mortality rate fell from 159 to 44.9 per thousand, while the adult illiteracy rate declined dramatically from 
61 per cent to 11.6 per cent (Chowdhury, 2001).
Indonesia had around 70 million people (60 per cent of the population) living in absolute poverty 
in 1970. Th   e number of absolute poor declined dramatically to 42.3 million (28.6 per cent) in 1980. By 
1996, the proportion had fallen further to 11.3 per cent. According to the UNDP’s human poverty index 
(HPI), 34 per cent of the population lived in poverty in 1990 and 24 per cent in 1996. Using an alternative 
consumption based measure to take account of the many poor households that spend more than two thirds 
of their expenditure on food, Dhanani and Islam (2000) estimated the incidence of poverty in 1996 at 33 
per cent. Provincial and district level data indicate that regional disparities in most HDI components either 
declined or remained unchanged. Inequality measures of non-income welfare indicators such as education, 
health, and the HDI suggest modest regional inequality. 
Inequality and social services
Despite impressive gains, Indonesia’s achievements in HDI and HPI rankings are still well behind the other 
second-tier newly industrializing East Asian countries (see Figures 5 through 8). However, starting from 
a lower base, Indonesia made more HDI gains than Malaysia, Th   ailand and the Philippines, until around 
1990. Th   is was also despite spending proportionately less on education and health relative to other countries 
in the region. Chowdhury (2001) argues that “Indonesia not only spent consistently less on human develop-
ment than the regional norm”, but also that “social spending ... had to bear the burden whenever the need 
for adjustment arose.” Total development expenditure dropped from over 51 per cent of total government 
expenditure to about 38 per cent over the same period. Expenditure on education and health fell from a 
peak of over 8 per cent of total government expenditure in 1984-1985 to about 6 per cent in 1990-1991, 
though Th   orbecke (1991) claims that Indonesia could not have done better with alternative packages. School 
dropout rates have been high (10 per cent for primary schools and 60 per cent for lower secondary schools).   
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More troubling has been the decline in the rate of transition from primary to lower secondary schools from 
84.5 per cent in 1980 to about 60 per cent in 1990 (World Bank, 1993: 117). 
Th   e main social welfare policy has been to rely on employment growth. Central government ex-
penditure on social security has been very low, for example, less than one per cent of GNP in 1995 (World 
Bank, 2000: 148: Figure 8.2). Th   e absence of social safety nets became obvious in the aftermath of the crisis, 
with the economically vulnerable most severely hit. However, the oﬃ   cial unemployment rate did not rise 
dramatically despite the severe output contraction. Th   ose who lost employment in the urban and formal 
sectors are believed to have survived in the rural and informal sectors. About a million people were probably 
absorbed by the previously shrinking agricultural sector. Th   e sudden movement of a huge number of unem-
ployed to the agricultural and informal sectors obviously had negative repercussions on the earnings of those 
already there. Th   e sudden increase in price inﬂ  ation from 6 per cent in 1997 to 58.5 per cent in 1998, and 
the slower growth in nominal wages sharply reduced real wages by about 34 per cent (Chowdhury, 2001). 
Th   us, although oﬃ   cial unemployment did not rise due to the crisis, earnings contracted severely, sharply 
increasing poverty. 
Th   ere were also declines in the development budget as well as in health and education spending 
from 1998. Th   is downturn was all the more serious in view of Indonesia’s historically low social spending and 
relatively modest human development gains by regional standards. Th   e World Bank (2000: 11) noted that 
the problem with health and education “is not so much the new impact of the crisis as the continuing, and 
chronic, problems that have developed in the basic healthcare and education delivery systems in Indonesia.”
Malaysia
Inequality 
Curiously, the World Bank’s (1993) ‘Miracle Volume’ suggests that Malaysia was the only exception to the 
regional trend of declining income inequality. In fact, it appears that government eﬀ  orts to reduce inter-eth-
nic inequality during the 1970s and 1980s apparently reduced overall inequality as well. Inequality increased 
from the late 1950s to the mid-
1970s, then declined among all major 
groups, especially in the 1980s, before 
rising again between the 1990s and 
2004 except during the 1997-98 crisis 
(see Tables 27 and 28). Between 1973 
and 1987, real per capita incomes 
rose by 63 per cent, or by an annual 
average of 3.8 per cent, despite a 
population growth rate averaging 2.7 
per cent yearly (Kharas and Bhalla, 
1991: 8). More signiﬁ  cantly, per 
capita income levels generally rose 
with the rapid growth and structural 
change during the seventies, though 
this was checked by labour immigra-
tion from the 1980s. 
Table 27. 
Malaysia: Distribution of households by 
monthly gross household income, 1995-2002
Income Class (RM)
Percentage share
1995 1997 1999 2002
499 and below 10.6 6.3 6.0 3.7
500    -      999 23.9 18.6 19.0 15.3
1,000   -   1,499 19.9 18.3 18.8 16.4
1,500   -   1,999 13.1 13.7 13.9 13.4
2,000   -   2,499 8.9 10.1 10.1 10.4
2,500   -   2,999 6.1 6.9 7.3 8.3
3,000   -   3,499 4.2 5.4 5.7 6.3
3,500   -   3,999 2.8 4.0 3.9 4.7
4,000   -   4,999 3.8 5.6 5.5 6.7
5,000 and above 6.7 11.1 9.8 14.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Ragayah (2002b: Table 12); Malaysia (2003).28  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Using Th   eil index decompositions, Ikemoto (1985: 358) argued that much of the (modest) decline 
in overall inequality between 1970 and 1979 was due to reduced inequality between—rather than within—
ethnic groups. However, since Anand (1983) found that less than ten per cent of overall income inequality in 
1970 may have been due to ethnic factors, the modest impact of its considerable ethnically-oriented ‘aﬃ   rma-
tive action’ eﬀ  orts on overall income inequality is not surprising. With the average Malay fertility rate about 
double the Chinese rate, and with the Indian rate slightly above the Chinese rate, Malay per capita income 
levels will continue to remain lower, and Malay poverty correspondingly higher, due to larger household sizes 
and dependency ratios. 
Table 29 shows monthly household income trends by ethnicity and location in Malaysia, especially 
in Peninsular Malaysia, since the 1970s. Th   ese trends suggest that rising incomes and poverty reduction in 
the 1970s may have been accompanied by growing income inequality. However, other evidence suggests that 
income inequality declined during the seventies and eighties, but has since increased (see Tables 29 and 30). 
Average inter-ethnic income disparities also declined during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period (1971-
1990), but have risen since the 1990s. Th   e apparently slightly greater decline of overall inequality in the 
1980s compared to the 1970s (also see Hashim, 1997) may have been due to a change in the nature of the 
data (household income surveys only started in 1984 and much of the earlier data are for household budgets 
or expenditure). It is also likely that the mid-1980s’ recession reduced inequality by limiting the incomes 
of the higher income groups. Partial economic liberalization and relatively less government interventions 
for redistribution since the late 1980s appear to have contributed to increased overall as well as inter-ethnic 
inequality since the early 1990s (see Tables 27 to 30).
Table 30 shows income distribution trends for the whole country as well as by location in Malaysia. 
Th  e  ﬁ  rst oﬃ   cial Household Income Surveys for 1984 and 1987 suggested declining overall income inequal-
ity in the 1980s. However, inequality between Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras as well as between town 
and country appear to have been falling fairly steadily since the seventies in Peninsular Malaysia. Inter-ethic 
and urban-rural disparities seem to have risen in the 1990s except during the 1997-98 crisis. Evidence avail-
able for 1984 and 1987 suggests greater inequality in Sabah and Sarawak as compared to Peninsular Malay-
sia. Th   e 1985-1986 recession reduced all major income disparities in Sabah, Sarawak, and the peninsula by 
adversely aﬀ  ecting the wealthy while sparing the poor.
Table 28. 
Malaysia: Mean monthly gross household income and 
Gini coefﬁ  cient by ethnic group and location, 1999, 2004
Ethnic group 
& strata 
In current prices (RM)
Avg. annual 
growth rate 
(%) In constant 1999 prices (RM)
Avg. annual 
growth rate 
(%) Gini coefﬁ  cient
1999 2004 2000-2004 1999 2004 2000-2004 1999 2004
Bumiputera 1,984 2,711 6.4 1,984 2,522 4.9 0.433 0.452
Chinese 3,456 4,437 5.1 3,456 4,127 3.6 0.434 0.446
Indians 2,702 3,456 5 2,702 3,215 3.5 0.413 0.425
Others 1,371 2,312 11 1,371 2,150 9.4 0.393 0.462
Malaysia 2,472 3,249 5.6 2,472 3,022 4.1 0.452 0.462
Urban 3,103 3,956 5 3,103 3,680 3.5 0.432 0.444
Rural 1,718 1,875 1.8 1,718 1,,744 0.3 0.421 0.397
Source: Malaysia (2006).Growth with Equity in East Asia  2 9
Poverty 
Although there is some controversy over the reliability of oﬃ   cial measures of poverty, it is generally agreed 
that there has been considerable reduction of absolute poverty in Malaysia, especially in Peninsular Malay-
sia, during the New Economic Policy’s ﬁ  rst Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) period (1971-1990).8 Oﬃ   cial 
8  Detailed information on poverty and income distribution in Malaysia is not publicly available, but has been culled 
from oﬃ   cial sources, especially government ﬁ  ve-year plan documents. Th   e credibility of oﬃ   cial Malaysian poverty 
data has been questioned on several grounds, e.g. the non-disclosure of the oﬃ   cial poverty line in plan documents 
until 1989 (Malaysia, 1989) has raised doubts about the possibility of poverty eradication by statistical manipulation 
or redeﬁ  nition of the poverty line. Even after the oﬃ   cial announcement of the poverty line, independent researchers 
do not have access to the data from which oﬃ   cial poverty measures are calculated. Th   ere are also concerns about the 
choice of measures (e.g. see Anand, 1983; Jomo and Ishak, 1986; Kharas and Bhalla, 1991).
Table 29. 
Peninsular Malaysia: Mean monthly household incomes by ethnic group and stratum, 1970-2004
 1970 1973 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002 2004
All 423 502 566 669 792 760 1,167 1,563 2,020 2,606 2,472 3,011 3,022
Bumiputera  (B) 276 335 380 475 616 614 940  1,604  1,984 2,376 2,522
Chinese  (C) 632 739 866 906 1,086 1,012 1,631  2,890  3,456 4,279 4,127
Indian  (I) 478 565 592 730 791 771 1,209  2,140  2,702 3,044 3,215
Others 1,304 1,798 1,395 1,816 1,775 2,043 955  1,284  1,371 2,165 2,150
Urban (U) 687 789 913 942 1,114 1,039 1,617   2,589 3,357 3,103 3,652 3,680
Rural (R) 321 374 431 531 596 604 951   1,326 1,704 1,718 1,729 1,744
C/B disparity ratio 2.3 2.21 2.28 1.91 1.76 1.65 1.74 1.73 1.8 1.83 1.74 1.8 1.64
I/B disparity ratio 1.73 1.69 1.56 1.54 1.28 1.26 1.29 1.26 1.33 1.42 1.36 1.28 1.27
U/R disparity ratio 2.14 2.11 2.12 1.77 1.87 1.72 1.7 1.75 1.95 2.04 1.81 2.1 2.11
Gini  Index 0.5 0.5 0.57 0.49    0.442 0.459 0.464 0.47 0.443  0.462
Theil Index 0.48 0.43 0.71 0.42
Sources: Malaysia (1981, 1989, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2006); Ragayah (2002b: Table 11)
Notes: Figures for 1970-1987 in constant 1978 prices; ﬁ  gures for 1990-1999 in constant 1990 prices; ﬁ  gures for 1999 and 2004 in 
constant 1999 prices.
Table 30. 
Malaysia: Income shares by income group and location, 1970-2004
1970 1973 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990 1995 1997 1999 2004
Total           
Top 20% 55.9 53.7 61.9 54.7 53.2 51.2 50.0 51.3 52.4 50.5  51.2
Middle 40% 32.5 34.0 27.8 34.4 34.0 35.0 35.5 35.0 34.4 35.5  35.3
Bottom 40% 11.6 12.3 10.3 10.9 12.8 13.8 14.5 13.7 13.2 14.0  13.5
Urban           
Top 20% 55.0 – – – 52.1 50.8   49.8 50.2 48.9  
Middle 40% 32.8 – – – 34.5 35.0   35.7 35.6 36.7  
Bottom 40% 12.2 – – – 13.4 14.3   14.5 14.2 14.9  
Rural           
Top 20% 51.0 – – – 49.5 48.3   47.4 48.2 48.0  
Middle 40% 35.9 – – – 36.4 36.7   37.1 36.6 36.7  
Bottom 40% 13.1 – – – 14.1 15.0   15.5 15.2 15.6
Sources: Malaysia (1981, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2006); Ragayah (2002b: Table 11.
Note: Th   e published ﬁ  gures for urban and rural Malaysia in 1990 and 1995 do not add up to 100.0  per cent, but only the 1990 
calculations are omitted because of the much greater disparities involved.30  DESA Working Paper No. 33
statistics suggest impressive (by international standards) reductions of poverty in the 1970s and early 1980s 
(World Bank, 1990). Th   e NEP’s Outline Perspective Plan, 1971-1990 (OPP1) aimed to reduce the oﬃ   cial 
poverty level from 49 per cent in Peninsular Malaysia in 1969 to 16 per cent in 1990. 
Since the government views poverty in absolute, rather than relative terms, and claims to moni-
tor the incidence of poverty in relation to a poverty line, income inequality can grow while the poverty rate 
declines if economic growth rates are suﬃ   ciently high. Th   e disclosure of the oﬃ   cial poverty line in 1989 
suggested that at least some of the poverty reduction, especially between 1976 and 1984, may have been due 
to the reduction of the per capita poverty line income from RM33.00 in 1970 to RM30.30 in 1987 in 1970 
prices (or from RM74.15 in 1970 to RM68.09 in 1987, in 1987 prices). Th   ere is also no way of indepen-
dently verifying the comparability of the oﬃ   cial data, e.g. in terms of methods of measurement, since they 
are not publicly available. Also, the diﬀ  erent nature of the three kinds of surveys involved means that they 
are not strictly comparable from a statistical point of view.9 It also seems likely that some methods of mea-
surement may have changed.10
Nevertheless, for want of more acceptable alternative data sources, oﬃ   cial ﬁ  gures have to be used. 
Th   e prevailing oﬃ   cial poverty measures use a household, rather than a per capita poverty line income 
yardstick. Malaysia (1989: 47) noted that if a per capita measure is used, instead of a household measure, 
the oﬃ   cial poverty rate for households in 1987 would have been 12.4 per cent, instead of 17.3 per cent, 
in Peninsular Malaysia. However, according to Kharas and Bhalla (1991: Table 3a)—who had access to the 
same oﬃ   cial data, but used a 30 per cent sample to measure per capita income distribution—14.9 per cent 
of households, or 18.6 per cent of the population, were poor in 1987, compared to 40.7 per cent of house-
holds, or 44.8 per cent of the population, in 1973, and 16.8 per cent of households, or 19.9 per cent of the 
population, in 1984.
Malaysia (2006: Box 16-2) ﬁ  nally revised the poverty line income (PLI) upwards in 2005 by 17.5 
per cent, from RM588 using the 1977 methodology to RM691 using the new 2005 methodology and corre-
sponding changes by region (Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak) as well as location (urban/rural). Th  is 
increase is mainly due to a signiﬁ  cant 41 per cent upward revision of the food PLI from RM294 using the 
1977 methodology to RM415 using the new 2005 methodology. Th   e food PLI is now the hardcore poverty 
line, i.e. much higher than the earlier deﬁ  nition of half the PLI. Not surprisingly, Malaysia (2006) reports a 
higher incidence of poverty for 2005 using the new methodology (5.7 per cent) compared to the old meth-
odology (4.4 per cent), for 2004 as well as 1999.
Table 31 summarizes oﬃ   cial data on the incidence of poverty by sector since 1970. Poverty inci-
dence has declined very signiﬁ  cantly from 49.3 per cent (oﬃ   cial estimate) or 56.7 per cent (Anand, 1983) 
in 1970. Besides the considerable reduction in the incidence of poverty (oﬃ   cially estimated to have declined 
from 49.3 per cent in 1970 to 15.0 per cent in 1989 in Peninsular Malaysia), the ratio of the incomes of 
those still below the poverty line to the poverty line income (PLI) increased considerably from 60.4 to 69.5 
  9  A closer examination of the poverty reduction during the 1970s and 1980s raises many troubling questions. 
10  For example, the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990 (Malaysia, 1986: 83) explicitly favours a more comprehensive 
concept of income “which takes into account the imputed values for own produce consumed at home and owner-
occupied housing as well as the full value of public services enjoyed by households, either free or at subsidized rates 
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per cent. 11 In other words, the mean 
income of the poor was 30.5 per 
cent—instead of 39.6 per cent—be-
low the PLI (Kharas and Bhalla, 
1991: Table 36). 
Th   roughout Malaysia, the 
incidence of poverty is higher in 
rural areas and among the indigenous 
Bumiputeras. Progress in poverty 
reduction was brisk until the early 1980s. Th  e  oﬃ   cial data suggest that poverty reduction was not steadily 
achieved over the two decades, but largely achieved between 1976 and 1984. Table 31 suggests that much of 
the reduction in poverty incidence was achieved in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with slower progress since 
then. It is likely that higher prices contributed signiﬁ  cantly to poverty reduction among rubber smallholders 
and rice farmers, two of the largest poverty groups, before farmers switched to other more remunerative oc-
cupations. Tables 32 and 33 survey recent poverty declines after the 1997-1998 crisis by location and among 
the three major ethnic groups. Between 1999 and 2004, the incidence of overall poverty declined from 8.5 
to 5.7 per cent (see Tables 32 and 33).  
11  According to Malaysia (1989: 45), the poverty line income (PLI) is deﬁ  ned as the minimum expenditure level to secure 
a certain standard of living. It is “updated annually using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to reﬂ  ect changes in price 
levels.” Th   e PLI “is about RM350 per month for a household of 5.14 persons in Peninsular Malaysia, RM429 per 
month for a household of 5.24 in Sarawak, and RM533 per month for a household of 5.36 in Sabah.” Th   e PLI should 
be adjusted to reﬂ  ect changes in the costs of speciﬁ  c items making up the PLI, as their relative weights presumably 
diﬀ  er from the breakdown of the CPI. Also, per capita consumption expenditure is probably a far better proxy for 
economic welfare than household income. 
Th   e government probably has a success story to tell with its data, and the credibility of the story would only be 
enhanced by better public access to it. It may also be useful to reconsider the composition of the PLI and to compare 
it with detailed consumer price trends to make more accurate inﬂ  ation adjustments to the original PLI, and also to 
determine a more meaningful PLI with the beneﬁ  t of hindsight and the experience of the last two decades of NEP 
implementation. Needless to say, signiﬁ  cant diﬀ  erences in regional and location-based living costs—e.g. between urban 
and rural areas and perhaps even among some of the major metropolitan centres—should be taken into consideration. 
Table 31. 
Malaysia: Incidence of poverty, 1970-2004
 1970 1980 1990 1997 1999 2002 2004 1999a 2004a
Total 49.3 29.2 16.5 6.1 7.5 5.1 4.4 8.5 5.7
Rural 58.6 37.7 21.1 10.9 12.4 11.4 - 14.8 11.9
Urban 24.6 12.6 7.1 2.1 3.4 2.0 - 3.3 2.5
Hard-core Poor     3.9 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.7 1.9 1.2
Source: Malaysia plan documents (various years).
Note: Th   e 1999a and 2004a ﬁ  gures are based on a new, higher poverty line 
(Malaysia, 2006: Box 16-2).
Table 32. 
Malaysia: Incidence of poverty and hardcore poverty by location, 1999, 2004
1999 2004
Malaysia Urban Rural Malaysia Urban Rural
Hardcore Poverty
Incidence of hardcore 
poverty (%) 1.9 0.5 3.6 1.2 0.4 2.9
# hardcore poor 
households 91.7 11.9 79.8 67.3 14.1 53.2
Poverty gap (%) 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.6
Overall Poverty 
Incidence of poverty (%) 8.5 3.3 14.8 5.7 2.5 11.9
# poor households 409.3 86.1 323.2 311.3 91.6 219.7
Poverty gap (%) 2.3 0.8 4 1.4 0.6 3
Total households 4,800 2,612.50 2,187.50 5,459.40 3,605.90 1,853.50
Source: Malaysia (2006: Table 16.1).
Note: Th  ese  ﬁ  gures are based on new, higher poverty line incomes and a new deﬁ  nition of the food poverty line income as the 
hardcore poverty line income (Malaysia, 2006).32  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Given the rapid growth of the Malaysian economy during this time period, poverty as deﬁ  ned by 
the government, could have been further reduced if more eﬀ  ective redistribution policies had been imple-
mented and government waste minimized. Th   e poor would have also beneﬁ  ted had government allocations 
been used more eﬀ  ectively for poverty reduction, instead of for enriching politicians, their ‘clients’, and for 
private contractors securing jobs for rural development projects. However, the signiﬁ  cance, consistency and 
credibility of oﬃ   cial poverty data have been challenged on several grounds. For instance, part of the decline 
in poverty may have been due to a lowering of the poverty line.12 Conversely, the Ninth Malaysia Plan, 
2006-2010 has announced a slightly higher poverty line based on recalculation of the costs of meeting food 
requirements, resulting in higher poverty ﬁ  gures for 1999 compared to those previously announced in the 
Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005.
Poverty and Policy
Despite the ostensible oﬃ   cial concern about poverty and the strong correlation between growth and poverty 
reduction, after more than three decades of the NEP, there is still relatively little detailed information about 
the characteristics of the poor that could help explain the reasons and causes of poverty, as well as appropri-
ate, eﬀ  ective and eﬃ   cient measures and eﬀ  orts to overcome it. Such careful analytical poverty proﬁ  les are 
especially urgent in view of the oﬃ   cially recognized phenomenon of ‘hard-core poverty’, that is said to be 
relatively unaﬀ  ected by existing poverty eradication policies.  
Th   e absence of a clear oﬃ   cial understanding of poverty has allowed eradication policies to go on re-
gardless of their eﬃ   cacy. Th   is has led to suspicion that these policies are maintained to facilitate patronage by 
the ruling party and for the beneﬁ  t of certain interest groups in the rural community, contractors, and other 
business interests, rather than for the purpose of genuinely improving the economic welfare of the poor. A 
great deal of what is oﬃ   cially categorized as spending on ‘poverty eradication’ actually refers to expenditure 
on rural and agricultural development, much of which does not beneﬁ  t the poor. Much expenditure for 
poverty eradication does not actually beneﬁ  t those in need. 
Th   e evidence suggests that poverty reduction has been largely due to rising incomes due to structural 
transformation, employment changes (Table 34), occupational mobility, higher commodity prices and in-
12 Th   ere is also some doubt as to whether the deﬁ  nitions of income used in the various surveys concerned have been 
consistent.
Table 33. 
Incidence of poverty and hardcore poverty by ethnic group, 1999, 2004 (%)
 
1999 2004
Bumiputera Chinese Indians Bumiputera Chinese Indians
Hardcore Poverty 2.9 0.2 0.3 1.9 0.1 0.3
Urban 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7 <.05 0.2
Rural 4.4 0.4 0.5 3.3 0.3 0.5
Overall Poverty 12.4 1.2 3.5 8.3 0.6 2.9
Urban 5.1 0.8 2.4 4.1 0.4 2.4
Rural 17.5 2.7 5.8 13.4 2.3 5.4
Poverty Gap 3.3 0.2 0.7 2.1 0.1 0.6
Source: Malaysia (2006)
Note: Th  ese  ﬁ  gures are based on new, higher poverty line incomes and a new deﬁ  nition of the food poverty line income as the 
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creased productivity. In rural areas, especially among peasants, reduced poverty seems to be largely attribut-
able to increased productivity (and prices) as well as out-migration and higher non-farm incomes. However, 
rising productivity mainly beneﬁ  ts those who own their own economic resources, especially land. Inequality 
in resource allocation, both in terms of ownership as well as access, has therefore meant that such productiv-
ity gains have tended to beneﬁ  t the more well-to-do. Hence, expenditure ostensibly for poverty eradication 
has actually brought greater beneﬁ  ts to the relatively well endowed, not the poor.  
Th   at fewer people participate in activities associated with poverty, such as rice cultivation, rubber 
smallholdings, ﬁ  shing and plantation labour, has helped decrease poverty. Th   ere has been a signiﬁ  cant de-
cline in the number of people working in most agricultural occupations. Th   ere has also been some abandon-
ment of previously cultivated land, and population/land ratios have risen despite earlier increases in culti-
vated land. Furthermore, the migration of younger workers to urban centres has aged the remaining rural 
population. Th   e economically active proportion of the population in agriculture has declined, which has left 
more land idle. Th   is phenomenon is also exacerbated by the uneconomic size of the land involved. 
China
Inequality
Over the past half century, inequality has peaked thrice in China; during the Great Famine, at the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, and most seriously, in the current era of globalization. In the early decades following 
the 1949 ‘liberation,’ land reform helped keep inequality relatively steady and low. With the Great Leap For-
ward and the ensuing Great Famine however, inequality reached an all time high by 1960. It subsequently 
fell during the recovery from these events, until the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966. Inequality 
peaked again by 1976. Th   e post-Cultural Revolution period of rural reform improved the distribution of 
wealth until 1984, after which China decentralized. As the Chinese opened their economy to more interna-
tional trade and foreign direct investment, inequality rose steadily and sharply until 1999. In fact, the Gini 
coeﬃ   cient of regional inequality in China in 1999 exceeded the peak of inequality reached in 1976 (Kanbur 
and Zhang, 2001). Table 35 summarizes these economic indicators for China from 1952 to 1999, while 
Table 36 presents long-run inequality trends.
Table 34. 
Peninsular Malaysia: Percentage distribution of the employed 
labour force by sector and ethnicity, 1970, 1986, 2003
Economic Sector
 1970 1986 2003
Malay Chinese Indian Total Malay Chinese Indian Total Malay Chinese Indian Total
Primary 65.2 33.5 47.6 51.6 35.1 14.7 30.1 27.4 10.8 5.1 7.8 11.9
 (67.6) (23.0) (9.4) (100.0) (68.6) (18.8) (11.7) 72.7 (18.9) (8.4) (100.0) (100.0)
Industry 6.0 21.0 5.9 11.4 18.5 30.9 23.4 23.4 30.5 32.6 36.8 30.4
 (28.2) (65.2) (5.3) (100.0) (42.5) (46.3) (10.6) 56.2 (33.0) (10.8) (100.0) (100.0)
Services 23.7 40.0 40.9 31.6 46.4 54.4 46.6 49.2 58.7 62.3 55.4 57.7
 (40.1) (44.8) (13.2) (100.0) (50.6) (38.7) (10.0) 57.6 (33.7) (8.7) (100.0) (100.0)
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 (53.5) (35.4) (10.2) (100.0) (53.6) (35.0) (10.6) 58.5 (32.2) (9.3) (100.0) (100.0)
Sources: Department of Statistics, Population Census, 1970; Labour Force Survey, 1986; Labour Force Survey Report 2003: Table A 
3.10; Mid-Term Review of the Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005: Table 3.7.
Notes: For 1970, these were collectively categorized as the ‘commerce’ sector. Th   e labour force ﬁ  gures in thousands for 1957 were: 
Total = 2,126.2; Malay = 1,004.3; Chinese = 759.0; Indians = 307.2. 1970: Total = 2,736.4; Malay = 1,435.0; Chinese = 990.0; 
Indians = 286.1. 1986: Total = 4,726.0; Malay = 2,535.3; Chinese = 1,655.7; Indians = 501.2.34  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Table 35. 











(Billions) Tariff rate (%) Centralization
Industria-
lization
1952 67.9 3.8 0.5 18.8 14.9 12..8 79.4 15.3
1953 82.4 4.6 0.5 22.2 18 11 81 17.3
1954 85.9 4.5 0.4 25.9 19.3 9.2 74.2 18.9
1955 91 6.1 0.5 26.6 19.9 7.6 74.8 19.7
1956 102.8 5.3 0.5 30.2 22.9 10.2 76.1 21.7
1957 106.8 5 0.5 33 23.2 9.6 70.3 25.5
1958 130.7 6.2 0.6 43.6 32.4 10.4 74.4 35.2
1959 143.9 7.1 0.7 58.4 15.1 9.9 25.9 43.8
1960 145.7 6.5 0.6 69 18.3 9.2 26.4 52.1
1961 122 4.3 0.6 41.3 9.6 14.5 23.2 37.7
1962 114.9 3.4 0.5 37.7 11.5 14.3 30.4 32.3
1963 123.3 3.6 0.4 39.4 9.6 11.6 24.5 33.5
1964 145.4 4.2 0.4 46.5 12.3 10.4 26.4 34.4
1965 171.6 5.5 0.6 54.9 18.2 10.3 33.1 30.4
1966 186.8 6.1 0.7 64 22.4 10.6 35 32.7
1967 177.4 5.3 0.4 50.3 16.1 7.3 31.9 28.1
1968 172.3 5.1 0.6 43.9 13.3 12.4 30.4 26.9
1969 193.8 4.7 0.6 61.4 20.1 13.5 32.7 31.7
1970 225.3 5.6 0.7 76.4 21.7 12.5 28.4 36.4
1971 242.6 5.2 0.5 86.3 15.9 9.5 18.5 39.5
1972 251.8 6.4 0.5 90.1 15.1 7.8 16.8 40.2
1973 272.1 10.4 0.9 100.1 18.4 8.7 18.4 39.9
1974 279.0 15.3 1.4 100.3 20.9 9.2 20.8 38.7
1975 299.7 14.7 1.5 106.7 18.1 10.2 17 40.2
1976 274.4 12.9 1.5 105.2 19.2 11.6 18.2 40.3
1977 320.2 13.3 2.6 118.6 21.9 19.8 18.5 41.9
1978 362.4 18.7 2.9 147.9 29.3 15.3 19.8 42.8
1979 403.8 24.3 2.6 159.9 38.4 10.7 24 41.3
1980 451.8 29.9 3.4 171.7 47.2 11.2 27.5 38.5
1981 486.0 36.8 5.4 177.7 51.4 14.7 28.9 34.5
1982 520.2 35.8 4.7 201.5 61.8 13.3 30.6 34.9
1983 595.7 42.2 5.4 233.5 85.0 12.8 36.4 36.1
1984 720.7 62.1 10.3 283.1 113.6 16.6 40.1 37.0
1985 898.9 125.8 20.5 353.5 140.6 16.3 39.8 38.6
1986 1020.1 149.8 15.2 385.9 149.5 10.1 38.7 38.6
1987 1195.5 161.4 14.2 422.8 156.4 8.8 37.0 38.7
1988 1492.2 205.5 15.5 471.8 168.2 7.5 35.6 38.4
1989 1691.8 220.0 18.2 532.4 189.5 8.3 35.6 39.4
1990 1859.8 257.4 15.9 584.6 206.6 6.2 36.6 38.3
1991 2166.3 339.9 18.7 639.3 231.9 5.5 36.3 41.5
1992 2665.2 444.3 21.3 733.8 268.7 4.8 36.6 44.8
1993 3456.1 598.6 25.6 578.1 194.3 4.3 33.6 49.7
1994 4667.0 996.0 27.3 708.1 319.0 2.7 45.0 35.5
1995 5749.5 1104.8 29.2 864.9 357.4 2.6 41.3 33.1
1996 6685.1 1155.7 30.2 1130.1 460.9 2.6 40.8 30.0
1997 7314.3 1180.7 31.9 1147.7 437.2 2.7 38.1 29.2
1998 7801.8 1162.2 31.3 1295.8 489.2 2.7 37.8 27.0
1999 9191.1 1373.7 56.2 1144.4 584.9 4.1 51.1 23.6
Source: China SSB (1999).
Note: Industrialization is share of the value of heavy industry output in the gross output value of agricultural and industry: tariﬀ   
rate is deﬁ  ned as the ratio of tariﬀ   revenue to total imports; Centralization index is the ration of central government’s revenue (both 
budgetary and extra-budgetary) to total government revenue.Growth with Equity in East Asia  3 5
Chinese inequality is com-
prised of disparities between urban 
and rural areas as well as within urban 
and within rural centres (see Table 
37). A number of studies suggest 
that urban and rural income dispari-
ties explain 75-80 per cent of overall 
Chinese inequality in the last two 
decades (e.g. Wei and Wu, 2001). Th  e 
World Bank (1997) estimated that 
inter-provincial inequality explained 
almost one-quarter of total inequality 
in 1995, and a third of the increase 
in inequality since 1985. Results 
show that inter-regional inequality 
accounted for over 70 per cent of in-
ter-provincial inequality in 1999, and 
all of the increase in inter-provincial 
inequality after 1978 (Bhalla, Yao, 
and Zhang, 2003). In recent years, 
gaps among the Eastern, Central 
and Western provinces seem to have 
grown the most. Inter-regional dispar-
ities declined before the mid-1960s, 
but have since risen continuously. 
China’s regional inequalities at the 
end of the 1990s were much larger 
than at the beginning of 1950s.
China has a huge population 
of almost 1.3 billion that increases by 
approximately 15-16 million people 
each year (China SSB, 2002). From 
1990 to 1999, the Chinese working-
age population grew from 679 million 
to 829 million, an increase of no less 
than 150 million in under a decade. 
Almost 70 per cent of the population 
still lives in the countryside, and em-
ployment in agriculture is stagnant, if 
not declining (333 million people in 
1995, falling to 329 million people in 
1999). Th   ere may be as many as 150 
million ‘surplus’ farm workers con-
straining the growth of real incomes 
for low-skilled non-farm occupations.
Table 36. 












1952 21.6 0.084 0.027 0.078 0.057 0.006
1953 24.2 0.103 0.032 0.096 0.071 0.007
1954 23.2 0.092 0.027 0.086 0.065 0.006
1955 21.6 0.081 0.022 0.077 0.059 0.004
1956 22.3 0.087 0.025 0.084 0.063 0.003
1957 23.2 0.092 0.021 0.09 0.07 0.002
1958 23 0.089 0.02 0.085 0.069 0.003
1959 29.1 0.136 0.031 0.133 0.105 0.003
1960 31.8 0.162 0.03 0.159 0.132 0.004
1961 28.7 0.134 0.027 0.132 0.108 0.002
1962 25.5 0.109 0.023 0.108 0.086 0.001
1963 25.5 0.105 0.025 0.104 0.08 0.001
1964 25.3 0.106 0.024 0.104 0.082 0.002
1965 24.4 0.101 0.022 0.1 0.079 0.001
1966 23.4 0.093 0.019 0.092 0.074 0.001
1967 23.2 0.092 0.017 0.091 0.075 0.001
1968 23.5 0.094 0.017 0.092 0.077 0.002
1969 23.7 0.098 0.015 0.095 0.083 0.003
1970 23.3 0.094 0.016 0.092 0.078 0.002
1971 23.8 0.099 0.014 0.098 0.085 0.002
1972 24.8 0.106 0.014 0.104 0.091 0.002
1973 24.6 0.108 0.013 0.103 0.092 0.002
1974 25.3 0.11 0.016 0.108 0.094 0.002
1975 26 0.116 0.017 0.112 0.099 0.003
1976 27 0.127 0.017 0.123 0.11 0.004
1977 26.8 0.125 0.017 0.111 0.108 0.004
1978 25.9 0.115 0.015 0.095 0.1 0.004
1979 24.2 0.1 0.015 0.1 0.085 0.005
1980 24.9 0.106 0.016 0.089 0.091 0.006
1981 23.8 0.096 0.015 0.076 0.081 0.006
1982 22.4 0.083 0.017 0.072 0.065 0.007
1983 21.8 0.078 0.017 0.07 0.06 0.005
1984 21.6 0.075 0.018 0.071 0.057 0.005
1985 21.7 0.076 0.017 0.075 0.058 0.005
1986 22.5 0.08 0.02 0.073 0.06 0.005
1987 22.6 0.08 0.023 0.077 0.057 0.007
1988 23.4 0.086 0.024 0.075 0.061 0.009
1989 23.1 0.083 0.024 0.078 0.059 0.008
1990 23.6 0.086 0.023 0.082 0.063 0.008
1991 24.3 0.092 0.024 0.089 0.068 0.01
1992 25.7 0.103 0.029 0.09 0.074 0.014
1993 26.2 0.107 0.029 0.092 0.078 0.017
1994 26.8 0.111 0.032 0.091 0.079 0.019
1995 27.1 0.114 0.036 0.091 0.078 0.023
1996 27.5 0.118 0.042 0.091 0.076 0.027
1997 27.7 0.121 0.044 0.092 0.076 0.028
1998 28.3 0.127 0.046 0.097 0.08 0.03
1999 30.3 0.159 0.065 0.124 0.094 0.034
Source: China SSB (1999).36  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Pressure on rural employ-
ment will probably intensify. Th  e 
thousands of new ‘township and 
village enterprises’ (TVEs) established 
in the early 1990s faced increasing 
competition from greater market 
integration, both nationally and 
internationally. Th   is meant that 
the main alternative source of rural 
labour absorption stagnated in terms 
of employment creation (at around 
127 million employees) after the mid-
1990s. Th   e rapid growth of TVEs in 
the 1980s and early 1990s was mainly 
based on the rapid expansion of small 
businesses in labour-intensive activi-
ties, which used simple technologies. 
Now, to compete internationally, 
TVEs have to increase productivity 
quickly, often by shedding labour or 
by raising labour output. As a result, 
rural underemployment will most 
likely continue its rapid ascension.  
Th   e farm sector continues 
to grow at around ﬁ  ve to six per cent 
per annum, and still invests on a large 
scale. Th   e total power of agricultural machinery rose from 361 million kWh in 1995 to 489 million kWh 
in 1999 (China SSB, 2002). However, prices paid to farmers are estimated to have dropped by 22 per cent 
between 1997 and 2002, reducing the growth of farm incomes. According to oﬃ   cial data, per capita farm 
income growth averaged about three per cent in the late 1990s, but many observers insist that rural incomes 
have stagnated, or even declined since the mid-1990s. For example, Chen Xiwen estimated that China’s 
farmers “suﬀ  ered an average decline in income in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001” (Financial Times, 31 Octo-
ber, 2002). Rural income distribution has become much more unequal, with the Gini coeﬃ   cient rising from 
0.21 in 1978 to 0.40 in 1998 (Yao, 2002). Qu Hongbin (2002) showed that the rural share of total con-
sumption fell from around 60 per cent in the early 1980s to 42 per cent in 2001. Th   e rural share of China’s 
population still stands at 65 per cent, with “grim prospects for most rural households” in the years ahead.
Poverty
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, during the early years of China’s rural reform, absolute poverty rapidly de-
clined (Nolan, 1988). However, in terms of international poverty lines, many people still qualify as poor. In 
eight out of 29 provinces, the incidence of poverty rose signiﬁ  cantly between 1985 and 1996 (Yao, 2002). In 
1995, 716 million (58 per cent of the population) made less than US $2 per day, and 280 million lived on 
less than US $1 per day (World Bank, 2001: 236). Most of them were rural dwellers or recent rural migrants 
Table 37. 




With adjustment for 
CoL difference
1980 24.99 na na na
1981 24.73 18.46 30.95 27.98
1982 24.4 16.27 28.53 25.91
1983 25.73 16.59 28.28 26.02
1984 26.69 17.79 29.11 26.89
1985 26.8 17.06 28.95 26.45
1986 28.48 20.66 32.41 29.2
1987 28.53 20.2 32.38 28.9
1988 29.71 21.08 33.01 29.5
1989 30.96 24.21 35.15 31.78
1990 29.87 23.42 34.85 31.55
1991 31.32 23.21 37.06 33.1
1992 32.03 24.18 39.01 34.24
1993 33.7 27.18 41.95 36.74
1994 34 29.22 43.31 37.6
1995 33.98 28.27 41.5 36.53
1996 32.98 28.52 39.75 35.05
1997 33.12 29.35 39.78 35
1998 33.07 29.94 40.33 35.37
1999 33.91 29.71 41.61 36.37
2000 35.75 31.86 43.82 38.49
2001 36.48 32.32 44.73 39.45
2002 na 32.65 na na
Source: Ravallion and Chen (2005).
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to the cities. Oﬃ   cial data for 2001 showed that the average per capita income of China’s 800 million rural 
residents was just US $290 (RMB $2,366), or 80 cents per day (China SSB, 2002: 343). Of the total rural 
population, approximately 580 million in the countryside (72.5 per cent of rural households) had less than 
US $360 per year (China SSB, 2002: 343).13 In other words, the number of poor people remains huge, and 
may even be growing. 
Th   e substantial growth of rural underemployment encouraged rural-urban migration and depressing 
non-farm wages for unskilled and low-skilled occupations. By 2002, around 150 million people, mainly with 
limited skills, worked in urban areas without permission for permanent urban residence. Even in the fast-
est growing region of China, the Pearl River Delta, real wages for unskilled labour during the 1990s did not 
increase, suggesting a Lewisian labour market and a ‘subsistence’ wage rate.
Meanwhile, China’s state-owned sector was rapidly shrinking and reducing employment. It has 
been estimated that between 1996 and 2001, thirty million workers were laid oﬀ   by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) (Financial Times, 21 November 2002). Some researchers estimate that more than 48 million people 
lost jobs due to the reform of SOEs. Th   us, relatively large numbers of rural migrants struggle for survival on 
subsistence wages in China’s urban areas. Th   ey have minimal social rights and after decades of an egalitarian 
social ethos, they observe the high-income lifestyles of privileged wage earners. Not surprisingly, urban social 
tensions have risen sharply.
In recent years, China began to overhaul its SOE sector while encouraging the emergence of a mod-
ern corporate sector. Since then, many loss-making SOEs have been shut down, merged, or sold, causing 
sharp decreases in state employment. As elsewhere, privatisation in China has been characterized by wide-
spread insider dealing and corruption. As much as RMB10 trillion (around US$1.2 trillion) in government 
assets may be privatized in the years ahead (Qu Hongbin, 2002). Th   is has major implications for the distri-
bution of wealth and income. Even a privatization enthusiast warns that “the privileged classes are likely to 
ﬁ  nd ways of further enriching themselves” (Qu Hongbin, 2002). A recent study of mainland bank deposits 
estimates that only 0.16 per cent of the population owns 65 per cent of the nation’s US $1.5 trillion liquid 
assets. China arguably has the highest concentration of wealth in Asia, with just two to three million people 
able to ‘get rich quickly’ (South China Morning Post, 29 March 2003).
A further source of rising urban social tensions has been the rapid growth of FDI, with an accumu-
lated stock of nearly US$400 billion in 2001 (UNCTAD, 2002). Th   is FDI often created isolated clusters of 
modern businesses in China’s cities, such as Beijing’s new ﬁ  nancial district, Shanghai’s Pudong Development 
Zone and numerous ‘high-technology’ parks across the country. Th   ese enclaves have considerable de facto 
autonomy. Th   ey provide pockets of relatively high-income employment for both Chinese and foreigners who 
then live in protected compounds, isolated from the rest of society. 
Th   e accelerated pace of ‘reform’ and ‘opening up’ since the mid-1990s has increased urban inequal-
ity. Th  e  Gini  coeﬃ   cient for urban income distribution using oﬃ   cial data rose from 0.25 in 1992 to 0.34 in 
2001 (China SSB, 2002). Th   e income of the richest ten per cent of the urban population rose from 3.3 times 
that of the poorest ten per cent in 1992 to 5.4 times in 2001. Over the same period, the income of the poor-
est ten per cent fell from 57 per cent of the ‘median income’ to 44 per cent. However, the oﬃ   cial data do not 
include most of the 150 million unauthorized rural migrants that unoﬃ   cially inhabit cities.  
13  Just 8.9 per cent of the total number of rural households, or approximately 71 million people, had an average per 
capita income of over US$600 (RMB5000) per year.38  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Unemployment and inequality appear to have been exacerbated by the 1990s reforms, even though 
average living standards continue to rise, at least in urban areas. Furthermore, the data greatly underesti-
mate the income of the richest urban Chinese and exclude the much larger incomes of foreign employees of 
multinationals, a fast growing segment of society. If all these factors were taken into account, the distribution 
of China’s urban incomes is likely to approach those of the most inegalitarian countries in the world. Mean-
while, progressive income tax accounts for a mere 6 per cent of government income compared with 30 per 
cent in many parts of Asia.
With rapid growth for more than two decades, the Chinese urban ‘middle class’ already appears to 
be quite large. Data for 2001 (China SSB, 2002) show that the top decile of the urban income distribution 
(around 48 million people) had an average per capita income of US $1,834, while the following decile (an-
other 48 million people) averaged around US $1,258 per capita. Th   ough we may conclude that the Chinese 
‘middle class’ is around 90-100 million, this is misleading.
Th   e average per capita income of China’s 480 million oﬃ   cially registered urban residents in 2001 
was just US $830, on par with the gross national product (GNP) per capita of low-income countries such as 
Albania, Uzbekistan, Sri Lanka and Cote d’Ivoire (World Bank, 2001: 274-275). If we include the unof-
ﬁ  cial urban population of around 150 million migrant workers, then the average income would be even 
lower. However, a recent study estimates that the average income of approximately 20 million urban Chinese 
households—i.e. around twelve per cent of the total number of oﬃ   cially registered urban households—is on 
par with the average for urban households in East Asia’s newly industrialized countries (Qu Hongbin, 2002). 
According to Hu Angang (1999), the government reported a registered unemployment rate of 3.1 
per cent in 1998, while his own estimate was 8 per cent. In 1998, new employment growth was 0.1 per cent, 
the lowest since 1949, despite near double-digit growth. Overall unemployment, including layoﬀ  s and rural 
migrants who lose their jobs, remains higher. Hu (1999) estimated urban unemployment at around 160 mil-
lion and rural unemployment at 170 million, for a national total of 330 million. Not surprisingly, incomes 
for those who have lost their jobs have been low. According to Hu, a laid-oﬀ   urban worker could get about 
15 per cent of the average monthly wage of Chinese workers in 1996-1997, while those laid oﬀ   in remote re-
gions and provinces hosting large SOEs received surprisingly little. As a result of increasing restructuring and 
massive layoﬀ  s, inequality in China rose sharply since 1992. Starting in 1999, China began to increase living 
allowances for laid oﬀ   workers, however a 30 per cent across-the-board wage hike did not fully materialize in 
most Chinese regions because local governments could not aﬀ  ord to pay. 
East Asian Contrasts
Th  e  World  Bank’s  East Asian Miracle volume created a myth of egalitarian export-oriented growth in the 
region by claiming that, “Th   e positive association between growth and low inequality in the HPAEs, and the 
contrast with other economies, is illustrated…. Forty economies are ranked by the ratio of the income share 
of the richest ﬁ  fth of the population to the income share of the poorest ﬁ  fth and per capita real GDP growth 
during 1965-1989…. Th   ere are seven high growth, low inequality economies. All of them are in East Asia; 
only Malaysia, which has an index of inequality above 15, is excluded” (World Bank, 1993: 29-30). How-
ever as Rao (1998) notes, “All that the data… can convey is that there are 22 (out of 40) economies with low 
relative inequality and varying economic growth rates. Th   us, the evidence is not strong enough to establish Growth with Equity in East Asia  3 9
a ﬁ  rm relationship between growth and relative inequality, notwithstanding the fact that seven high growth 
and low relative inequality economies are located in East Asia.” 
Hence, the available evidence suggests that Taiwan is almost unique in East Asia in having estab-
lished and sustained an egalitarian income distribution. Its Gini coeﬃ   cient remains close to the 0.30-0.31 
level, with no signiﬁ  cant decline after the late 1960s. In the case of Korea, too, the Gini coeﬃ   cient did not 
fall after 1965. Indonesia showed some decline in the Gini coeﬃ   cient for household expenditure, but there 
was no evidence that income inequality had declined. Reduction of inter-ethnic income diﬀ  erences has been 
the main factor behind the reduction of the Malaysian Gini coeﬃ   cient from 0.5 to around 0.45 in the 1970s 
and 1980s, before rising again in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the Th   ai Gini coeﬃ   cient for income distribution 
rose from 0.41 in 1962 to a little over 0.5 in 1992. 
Regardless of trends, income inequality in Southeast Asia seems to be signiﬁ  cantly higher than in 
Taiwan and Korea, where signiﬁ  cant asset redistribution took place with land reforms in the late forties and 
early ﬁ  fties. Malaysia, Th   ailand and possibly Indonesia have income Gini coeﬃ   cients of 0.45 or more. None 
of them had low Gini coeﬃ   cients at the beginning of their rapid growth phases or have had sustained reduc-
tions in income inequality since then. Only in Korea and Taiwan did land reforms contribute to low initial 
levels of income inequality. Th   e subsequent evidence suggests the maintenance of these relatively low levels 
of inequality, at best. 
Th   e evidence on income inequality in these ﬁ  ve HPAEs does not support Th   e East Asian Miracle’s 
claim of declining income inequality during the rapid growth phase after 1965. Corroborating Rao (1988), 
You (1998) also found that, among the World Bank’s eight HPAEs, only Japan, Korea and Taiwan have 
had unusually low inequality. He argues that they were able to combine low inequality with rapid growth 
because:
(1)  they started rapid growth with an exceptionally egalitarian distribution of real and ﬁ  nancial 
assets as a result of post-war, mainly agrarian, reforms; 
(2)  rapid income growth was based on capital accumulation as well as employment expansion; 
(3) high  proﬁ  t shares were crucial for accumulation, by generating high savings rates and induc-
ing high investment rates (though high proﬁ  ts are not suﬃ   cient for rapid growth, the three 
achieved rapid accumulation because eﬀ  ective institutions and policies translated large proﬁ  ts 
into high savings and investment rates); 
(4)  wealth distribution was relatively even due to the highly egalitarian post-war redistribution and 
the unusual savings behaviour of low-income households, especially in Japan and Taiwan; 
(5)  although wage distribution was not particularly egalitarian, rapid employment expansion and 
near full employment probably meant a wider and more even distribution of wage-earning op-
portunities among households.
For You (1998), the future prospects for income distribution in the relatively egalitarian, three 
Northeast Asian countries are not good. Th   e favourable inﬂ  uence of the initially egalitarian wealth distribu-
tion will only continue to diminish over time, and little more can be achieved from further employment ex-
pansion. In fact, there is evidence of growing wealth concentration in all three relatively egalitarian HPAEs, 
especially with the recent asset-price bubbles from the late 1980s. It appears that income inequality rose in 
Japan; Taiwan; and Korea during the 1980s. 40  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Th   e World Bank’s generalization about income inequality reduction is erroneous. Gini coeﬃ   cients in 
Korea and Taiwan have been low, and relatively the same, while inequality in Indonesia, Malaysia and Th  ai-
land has ﬂ  uctuated from higher levels. Korea and Taiwan maintained relatively low Gini coeﬃ   cients since 
the 1960s, although there is evidence of increasing income inequality in recent years, as in Japan. Most of 
the data for Indonesia has been for consumption, and earlier declines in inequality have given way to more 
recent increases, as in Malaysia. Th   ai income inequality has declined less than in the other two Southeast 
Asian economies while progressive public—especially social—expenditure has been more recent in Th  ailand 
than in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Th   e relatively low Gini coeﬃ   cients for Korea, .34 in 1965 and 0.33 in 1970 have been attributed to 
a number of factors. Th   e most important of these include the 1947 and 1949 land reforms (which reduced 
income inequality among farm households), asset destruction during the Korean War, and conﬁ  scation of 
illegally accumulated wealth (Choo, 1975). Rao (1998) also notes no evidence of a continued decline in 
income inequality, as suggested by the World Bank (1993).
Th   e available evidence suggests that the Gini coeﬃ   cient for Taiwan declined from the 1950s until 
the early 1970s, and then stayed in the range of 0.28-0.30 during most of the 1970s and in the early 1980s. 
Th   e measure has risen slightly since the mid-1980s. Land reform, labour-intensive industrialization, full em-
ployment, oﬀ  -farm work, educational expansion and industrial organization (with large state-owned enter-
prises coexisting with small and medium-sized private ﬁ  rms) are believed to have contributed to the relatively 
egalitarian income distribution of Taiwan. 
Th   e World Bank and others have argued that, owing to the exceptional nature of Japan and the ﬁ  rst 
generation newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of East Asia, the rest of the developing world should emu-
late the second-tier Southeast Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) instead. While the more recent 
experiences of the second-tier Southeast Asian NICs may be more relevant to the rest of the South in some 
respects, such as resource wealth, the superior industrial policy as well as the more egalitarian initial condi-
tions and development outcomes of Japan, Korea and Taiwan should not be overlooked. 
Despite impressive gains in recent decades, Southeast Asian achievements in literacy, health and me-
dia access as well as HDI and HPI rankings have been modest and quite uneven, as reﬂ  ected in Figures 5 and 
6. Malaysia is generally ahead of Th   ailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, with the Philippines still ahead of 
Indonesia on most indicators despite its dismal economic performance in recent decades. As Figures 7 and 
8 show, public spending on health in Korea was proportionately well ahead of its Southeast Asian counter-
parts. Surprisingly, this was not the case with education, where the ﬁ  gures reﬂ  ect the much higher private 
spending on education in the peninsula.
Globalization, Growth and Inequality
It has been claimed that economic liberalization and globalization have helped spur economic growth 
throughout the world. However, according to Weisbrot, Naiman, and Kim (2000), the oﬃ   cial data for the 
last two decades (1980-2000) suggest a diﬀ  erent outcome. Economic growth has slowed dramatically, espe-
cially in the less developed countries, as compared with the previous two decades (1960-1980). For example, 
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growth was 33 per cent during 1980-2000. Eighty-nine countries, or 77 per cent of all countries consid-
ered saw their per capita growth rate fall by at least ﬁ  ve percentage points between 1960 and 1980 and the 
1980-2000 time periods. Only 14 countries, or 13 per cent, saw their per capita growth rate rise during this 
timeframe. In Latin America, GDP per capita grew by 75 per cent during 1960-1980, but only by 6 per cent 
during 1980-1998. GDP per capita for sub-Saharan Africa grew by 36 per cent in the ﬁ  rst period, and has 
since fallen by 15 per cent. 
Southeast Asia achieved high growth rates especially during 1987-1997, but did not surpass its 
growth between 1960 and 1980. Th   e only regional exception to this trend was East Asia, which grew faster 
from 1980 to 1998 than in the previous period. Th   is anomaly however can be explained by the quadrupling 
of GDP, over the last two decades, in China, where 83 per cent of the population of East Asia resides. Hence, 
advocates of the Washington Consensus cannot point to any region in the world as having succeeded by 
adopting the neo-liberal policies they prescribed—or, in many cases, imposed—on borrowing countries. Un-
derstandably, they are reluctant to claim credit for China, which maintains a non-convertible currency, with 
state control over its banking system, and other major violations of Washington Consensus prescriptions.
Weisbrot, Naiman, and Kim (2000) argue that if globalization and other policies promoted by the 
IMF and the World Bank have not led to increased growth, it becomes extremely diﬃ   cult to defend these 
prescriptions. Th   e costs of these changes such as the destruction of industries and the dislocation of people, 
the harsh ‘austerity’ medicine often demanded by these institutions and by international ﬁ  nancial markets, 
burden society without any clear countervailing beneﬁ  t. Weisbrot, Naiman, and Kim (2000) also note that 
the IMF promulgated policies that have undoubtedly reduced cumulative economic growth for hundreds of 
millions of people. In East Asia, IMF policies exacerbated the ﬁ  nancial crises by requiring pro-cyclical mac-
roeconomic responses, which deepened the crises in the region and delayed recovery. In Russia and Brazil in 
1998, the Fund’s support for overvalued exchange rates that ultimately collapsed caused serious economic 
damage. IMF policies in the economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have, over the last 
decade, contributed to one of the worst economic disasters in the history of the world. Russia lost more than 
half its national income, as transition economies accounted for 70 per cent of the economic stagnation in the 
1990s (Reddy and Minoiu, 2003). Th   is is in sharp contrast to the East Asian transition economies of China 
and Vietnam. 
Easterly (2000a, 2000b) has argued that, “Th   e poor in developing countries are often better oﬀ   
when their governments ignore the policy advice of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.” 
IMF and World Bank policymakers claim that their reforms often require necessary short-term pain for the 
sake of long-term gain. Yet, as Easterly points out, during times of economic growth, the poor did not gain 
as much in countries in where the IMF lent money as they did in places with no programs. In countries 
without an IMF presence, the poor were also not hurt as badly by recessions. He also found that China, 
India and other countries that did not follow IMF and World Bank economic programs saw more poverty 
reduction in times of economic growth than nations that took the advice of Washington-based lenders. 
Signiﬁ  cant increases in inequality appear to have accompanied accelerating globalization. In the ﬁ  rst 
ever study to calculate world income distribution from household income surveys, Milanovic (1999) found 
that the distribution of individual incomes and expenditures were more unequal in 1993 than in 1988. His 42  DESA Working Paper No. 33
study found world income inequality to be very high.14 Th   e Gini coeﬃ   cient for incomes in 1993 was 66 
adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), and almost 80 using current US$ incomes. Milanovic found 
income inequality increased during 1988-1993 as the Gini for PPP-adjusted incomes in 1988 was 62.5. 
Depending on the measure used (Gini or Th   eil), inter-country inequality accounted for 75 to 88 per cent of 
total inequality. Inter- as well as intra-country inequality rose between 1988 and 1993, with the former ris-
ing much more when economic globalization was on the rise. 
UNDP (1999) oﬀ  ers evidence of growing global inequality. Government roles have also changed 
over the last two decades, and their impact has become more regressive. Tax systems have also become more 
regressive. In many countries, income tax rates have become less progressive, causing direct taxes to also be-
come less progressive, if not regressive. Meanwhile, the share of direct taxes has tended to decline compared 
to the generally more regressive indirect taxes. All this has been accompanied by various eﬀ  orts to reduce 
overall tax rates, in line with supply-side economic philosophy, which became especially inﬂ  uential during 
the 1980s under the United States President, Ronald Reagan.
Lower tax revenues and increasing insistence on balanced budgets or ﬁ  scal surpluses has generally 
constrained government spending, especially what is deemed as social expenditure, with some deﬂ  ationary 
consequences. Privatisation in many countries has provisionally increased government revenues, enabling 
governments to temporarily balance budgets or have surpluses on the basis of one-oﬀ   sales income. Such 
budgetary balances are clearly unsustainable, but have succeeded in, at least momentarily, obscuring the im-
minent ﬁ  scal crises such policies may cause.
Implications of Economic Liberalization for Equity in East Asia
Th  e  ﬁ  scal and foreign debt crises of the early and mid-1980s took a heavy toll on many countries in the 
region. Most governments emerged leaner by the late 1980s, though not necessarily more eﬀ  ective, partly 
due to economic liberalization. Government expenditure as a percentage of total economic activity has been 
reduced, public sectors checked, state-owned enterprises constrained, and privatisation policies pursued. 
Government regulations have been reduced, mainly to induce greater private, especially foreign, investments. 
While economic welfare has often been adversely aﬀ  ected, some waste and undesirable regulation have also 
been eliminated in the process. Overall though, available information does not support the creation of mean-
ingful welfare balance sheets.  
14  Milanovic (1999) oﬀ  ers other dramatic measures of global inequality such as: 
• Th  e  bottom  ﬁ  ve per cent grew poorer while the richest quintile gained 12 per cent in real terms, i.e. more than 
twice as much as mean world income (5.7 per cent) 
• Th   e richest one per cent of people in the world receive as much as the bottom 57 per cent, i.e. less than 50 million 
receive as much as 2.7 billion, or more than 54 times as many people. 
•  An American with the average income of the poorest US decile is better oﬀ   than two- thirds of the world’s 
population. 
• Th   e top decile of the US population had the aggregate income of the poorest 43 per cent of the world’s people, 
i.e. the total income of 25 million Americans was equal to that of almost two billion people, or almost 40 times as 
many people. 
• Th   e ratio of the average income of the world’s top 5 per cent to the bottom 5 per cent rose from 78 in 1988 to 114 
in 1993. 
•  75 per cent of the world population received 25 per cent of the world’s PPP-adjusted income, and vice versa. 
•  84 per cent of the world population received 16 per cent of the world’s unadjusted US$ income, and vice versa
  Milanovic has since shown that world inequality declined slightly between 1993 and 1998, though inequality in 1998 
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Th   e consequences of globalization and liberalization for growth, poverty and income inequality in 
East Asia are quite complicated and also quite contingent. Th   e information available does not allow a care-
fully considered assessment of the welfare consequences of recent liberalization and globalization for diﬀ  er-
ent socio-economic groups, including those in poverty. Korea and Taiwan lacked natural resources, but have 
transformed their economies through interventionist industrial policies. Malaysia, Th   ailand and Indonesia 
have relied more on resource rents to alleviate poverty, though growth has also been important. Export-ori-
ented industrialization, driven primarily by foreign capital in Southeast Asia, has helped reduce unemploy-
ment and raise household incomes there. 
Rapid growth has facilitated poverty alleviation. Th   e East Asian economies reviewed here seem to 
have managed to grow quickly without seriously worsening income distribution. All these economies intro-
duced policy instruments to alleviate poverty and, to a lesser extent, to improve income distribution. Poverty, 
both urban and rural, has generally continued to decline.
Income distribution in Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Indonesia has intermittently improved. Only 
Th   ailand, which has historically been the most liberal of the six main economies under consideration and 
the least committed to redistribution, experienced a long-term tendency toward greater income inequality. 
In fact, it was the only economy among the six that recorded increased poverty in the mid-1980s and greater 
urban poverty in 1990. 
Before the currency and ﬁ  nancial crises of 1997-1998 induced a regional recession in 1998, liberal-
ization had not signiﬁ  cantly increased poverty in the region (except perhaps in Th   ailand), but seems to have 
by worsened inequality in Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan—a trend more consistently pronounced in Th  ailand 
from an earlier period. In other words, although poverty in these economies continued to fall with rapid 
growth, productivity gains and declining unemployment, income inequality has worsened in Korea, Taiwan, 
and Malaysia since the 1980s. 
After 1980, liberalization seems to have adversely aﬀ  ected income distribution in the region. Rising 
income inequality under essentially laissez-faire conditions in the past have re-emerged as the economies of 
the region liberalized once again. Deregulation, reduced government intervention, declining commitment to 
earlier redistributive mechanisms, and greater government eﬀ  orts to meet investor expectations probably all 
contributed to increased inequality in the region. Recent and current trends suggest the likelihood of wors-
ening inequality in the future (see Ishak, 1996; Onchan, 1995). Liberalization and renewed commitments to 
protecting property rights have discouraged redistributive policies and aggravated social inequality in these 
countries. More liberalization will likely exacerbate these regressive trends.
Contrary to the claims of the World Bank, the East Asian economies do not demonstrate any clear 
relationship between export-oriented industrialization and better income distribution (see also Alarcon, 
1996). Th   ough export orientation can sustain long-term growth, eﬀ  ective mechanisms for redistribution 
usually implemented through government intervention are needed to improve equity. Th  e  World  Bank 
recommends that other developing countries try to emulate the second-tier Southeast Asian NICs, especially 
their 1980s liberalization policies. However, the evidence suggests that Korea and Taiwan had much more 
egalitarian growth when compared to Malaysia, Indonesia and Th   ailand, and that inequality has increased 
all-around since liberalization, especially in Southeast Asia. 44  DESA Working Paper No. 33
Th   e simplistic World Bank picture of East Asian ‘growth with redistribution’ or ‘egalitarian growth’ 
does not stand up to careful empirical scrutiny. Northeast Asia has been distinctly more egalitarian than South-
east Asia, and recent economic liberalization has exacerbated inequality in the region (see Table 38). Interest-
ingly, those economies with more elaborate, eﬀ  ective and successful industrial policies have also been more 
egalitarian, although available data does not allow a meaningful testing for correlation, let alone causality.
In light of these develop-
ments, it is important to consider 
possible measures to try to sustain 
declines in poverty and reductions in 
inequality despite continued pressures 
for trade, ﬁ  nancial and investment 
liberalization. Poverty alleviation and 
redistribution policies are still needed, 
particularly in Th   ailand, where they 
have been absent and income distri-
bution has deteriorated over the last 
few decades. Evidence from other 
countries in the region suggests that 
eﬀ  orts targeting poor groups, such 
as land reform, subsidized housing, 
and subsidized access to education, 
have been successful and should be 
emulated.
Liberalization of agricul-
tural, especially food, trade should 
be gradual to facilitate adjustment. 
With real wage increases in Korea and 
Taiwan from the late 1980s, such ag-
ricultural trade liberalization allowed 
cheap food imports from abroad to 
destroy the livelihoods of many farm-
ers in Korea, though the problem has 
been less signiﬁ  cant in Taiwan due 
to greater agricultural productivity 
and the importance of oﬀ  -farm work. 
Similarly, Malaysia, Indonesia and, to 
a lesser extent, Th   ailand too will face 
similar challenges as cheap rice im-
ports from Vietnam and China enter 
their economies. Th   e livelihoods of 
farmers would have been negatively 
aﬀ  ected, though the collapse of many 
Southeast Asian currencies since mid-
Table 38. 
Six East Asian Countries: Income Share by Quintile
   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
T/B 
ratioa
China 1998 5.9 10.2 15.1 22.2 46.6 7.9
Koreab 1965 5.8 13.6 15.5 23.3 41.8 7.3
 1970 7.3 12.3 16.3 22.4 41.6 5.7
 1976 5.7 11.2 15.4 22.4 45.3 7.9
 1982 6.9 11.9 16.2 22 43 6.3
 1988 7.4 12.3 16.3 21.8 42.2 5.7
 1993 7.5 12.9 17.4 22.9 39.3 5.2
 1996 8.2 13.3 17.5 23.1 37.9 4.63
 1998 7.4 12.8 17.1 22.9 39.8 5.41
 1999 7.3 12.6 16.9 22.9 40.2 5.49
Indonesia 1976 6.6 7.8 12.6 23.6 49.4 7.5
 1987 8.8 12.4 16 21.5 41.3 4.7
 1990 8.7 12.1 15.9 21.1 42.3 4.9
 1999 9 12.5 16.1 21.3 41.1 4.6
Malaysia 1973 3.5 7.7 12.4 20.3 56.1 16
 1987 4.6 9.3 13.9 21.2 51.2 11.1
 1989 4.6 8.3 13 20.4 53.7 11.7
 1997 4.4 8.1 12.9 20.3 54.3 12.3
 1999 14.0 35.5 50.5 na
 2002 13.5 35.2 51.3 na
 2004 13.5 35.3 51.2 na
Philippines 1961 4.2 7.9 12.1 19.3 56.4 13.4
 1965 3.5 8 12.8 20.2 55.4 15.8
 1971 3.8 8.1 13.2 21.1 53.9 14.2
 1985 5.2 8.9 13.2 20.2 52.5 10.1
 1988 6.5 10.1 14.4 21.2 47.8 7.4
 1997 5.4 8.8 13.2 20.3 52.3 9.7
Thailand 1975-
1976 5.6 9.6 13.9 21.1 49.8 8.9
 1981 4.6 7.9 12.1 19.9 55.6 12.1
 1988 4.5 8.1 12.3 20.3 54.9 12.2
 1990 4.1 7.4 11.6 19.7 57.3 14
 1992 4 7.1 11.1 18.8 59.1 14.8
 1998 4.2 7.7 11.9 19.8 56.3 13.4
Source: Medhi and Ragayah (2006: Table 4). 
Notes: a T/B ratio is the ratio of income share of the Top (richest) quintile to 
Bottom (poorest) quintile. b After 1993, data from www.gpn.org/data/korea/
korea-data.pdf.Growth with Equity in East Asia  4 5
1997 changed the terms of trade for agriculture once again, at least for the near future. Alternative employ-
ment sources such as the promotion of industrial dispersal to raise oﬀ  -farm incomes, as in Japan and Taiwan, 
also need to be developed by the governments under consideration. Th   e regional recession in 1998 temporar-
ily revived interest in questions such as food security, which had been largely forgotten with the enthusiasm 
for liberalization and globalization in the preceding decade. 
While direct subsidies may be diﬃ   cult to sustain, new forms of indirect subsidization may well 
compensate. For example, increased government education and training eﬀ  orts can become an important 
means of advancing industrial and technological capabilities. Taiwan and Korea have successfully pursued 
such eﬀ  orts for some time. While the demand for skilled labour has risen substantially in Malaysia and Th  ai-
land, earlier government eﬀ  orts have been inadequate to meet these requirements. Th   e improvement of the 
labour force should help raise the competitiveness of ﬁ  rms and economies, and narrow wage diﬀ  erentials and 
income inequality more generally. 
Th   e East Asian experience with labour market liberalization has therefore been quite complicated. 
Labour market liberalization has undoubtedly undermined labour market segmentation in signiﬁ  cant ways, 
but such labour market rigidities still prevail. Some rigidities are becoming even more pronounced with 
more educational and skill specialization as well as greater use of foreign labour—with reduced ‘citizenship 
rights’—at both ends of the labour force. In most East Asian economies, except for the ‘new democracies’ 
of Korea and Taiwan, labour regulations have not improved signiﬁ  cantly in recent decades, resulting in 
more casualized and vulnerable labour relations. Th   is has enhanced labour ﬂ  exibility without a concomitant 
improvement in labour security. Th  e  signiﬁ  cance of corporate savings in explaining the high savings rate as-
sociated with the East Asian region suggests that this may have been at the expense of labour incomes.
While changing production relations at the international level, variously described as international 
or global ‘production networks’ or ‘value chains’, have brought about some of this greater ﬂ  exibility, much 
of this has been promoted by governments trying to attract investments and thus enhance growth. How-
ever, there has been relatively little resistance to such casualization, as its negative consequences were partly 
oﬀ  set by the post 1985 boom (after the appreciation of the yen and the currencies of the ﬁ  rst-tier East Asian 
NIEs), which has been accompanied by declining unemployment as well as improved labour remuneration 
to retain employees. However, such casualization negates the likelihood of corporatism, and hence, of greater 
commitment by workers as ‘stakeholders’, as in Japan, Korea, and Singapore. Weak institutional develop-
ment governing labour relations exacerbated the welfare of workers in the region. Liberalization also weak-
ened the bargaining power of workers in Malaysia, Th   ailand and Indonesia, and may thus have worsened 
income distribution.
Unions could instead be encouraged to collaborate with management and the government to 
enhance social corporatism so that enhanced trust, commitment and eﬃ   ciency from such partnerships can 
help raise competitiveness and workers’ remuneration. Th   is would probably involve more multi-skilling, 
cross-skilling and institutionalization of the work process, including union participation in worker training 
to strengthen eﬀ  ective tripartism, i.e. institutionalized consultations involving labour, employers and the 
government. Such ﬂ  exible work practices can also reduce occupational hierarchies, status diﬀ  erentials and 
income inequalities. 
Technological development is essential for the success of such eﬀ  orts. Growth should become a 
shared responsibility, with all parties beneﬁ  ting. Commitment to technology development—e.g., through 46  DESA Working Paper No. 33
subsidization of catching-up activities—will become increasingly crucial to sustaining industrialization, 
growth and improved living standards. However, technology development eﬀ  orts should not merely focus on 
ﬁ  rms alone. Th   e broader institutional set-up for promoting a better national system of innovation, including 
upgrading labour force skills, will be critical.
As traditional industrial policy measures are increasingly negated, there is likely to be greater interest 
in and attention to human resource development (HRD) eﬀ  orts, oﬀ  ering a rare window of opportunity for 
social development proponents to advance their agenda. However, there is also a danger that only social de-
velopment measures considered supportive of economic growth and industrialization, especially in the short 
and medium term, will be adopted, as others are neglected and eventually quietly forgotten.
In the long term, continued progress in health, education and labour productivity will be necessary 
to sustain economic growth and improve living standards. Economic growth and social development should 
increase in tandem. Ramirez, Ranis and Stewart (1997) postulate a cumulative cycle of economic growth 
and human development, based on two chains: one linking economic growth to human development, the 
other linking human development to economic growth. Th   ey found that higher social expenditure improves 
human development, and that high investment rates and more equitable income distribution bolstered 
economic growth. Some East Asian economies seem to have such ‘virtuous circles’, with relatively high 
literacy rates and life expectancies, among other positive social indicators. Th   ese countries may well be poised 
for further social development and economic growth. Yet, as the Korean experience suggests, institutional 
reforms to ensure such an outcome will only come about through public pressure for and government com-
mitments to social development. 
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